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THE UNINTENDED CULTURAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC POLICY: A 
COMMENT ON THE SYMPOSIUM 
Richard H. Pi/des* 
Common to many articles in this Symposium is a concern that the 
much vaunted "New Public Law" scholarship strikingly resembles the 
old. With broadranging ambitions, New Public Law scholars have 
turned to political science, policy analysis, economics, social science, 
and other areas for insight into the pathologies of the modem regula-
tory state. But as the contributions of Professors Eskridge, Peller, 1 
and Rubin2 recognize, these quests principally have yielded sugges-
tions for only marginal refinements in the practices of courts. Seem-
ingly peripheral concerns - for proper methods and resources of 
statutory interpretation, or, as in the contribution of Professors Farber 
and Frickey, for the relevance of statutory law for common law deci-
sionmaking - have dominated New Public Law scholarship to date. 
These concerns are significant. But they nonetheless appear re-
mote from the profound institutional and cultural failings these same 
public law scholars depict. Aims and achievements, diagnoses and 
cures, remain disturbingly distant. Cass Sunstein's After the Rights 
Revolution, 3 for example, among the most significant works in the 
field, opens with a powerful taxonomy of regulatory failures and aims 
to defend and reconceive governmental action in light of these failures. 
Yet its principal recommendations are for improved methods of statu-
tory interpretation.4 Are we public law scholars destined to be only so 
many Neros, fiddling before courts while the republic bums? 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1979, Princeton; J.D. 1983, 
Harvard. - Ed. For helpful criticisms under significant time constraints, I would like to thank 
Alex Aleinikoff, Guyora Binder, David Charny, Don Herzog, James Krier, Larry Kramer, Jeff 
Lehman, William Miller, and Cass Sunstein. I must also express particular appreciation to Eliz· 
abeth Anderson, for ideas, arguments, and specific formulations that inform much of this essay; 
Elizabeth Foote, for ongoing conversations on the cultural dimensions of regulatory policy; and 
Sarah Zearfoss, for research assistance gracefully performed in the face of unreasonable 
demands. 
1. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural 
Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991). 
2. Rubin, The Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792 
(1991). 
3. C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990). 
4. Sunstein recognizes that improving these practices can only be a "partial corrective" to the 
pathologies of regulatory legislation. Id. at 10. 
936 
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Implicit in New Public Law scholarship is a struggle to find ways 
to incorporate the most provocative insights it has spawned. Most ar-
resting among these is the understanding that private preferences and 
public values are not static, but rather partially forged by the ongoing 
content and experience of public policy itself. Under this view prefer-
ences can be "adaptive," or "endogenous," or in the catch phrase of 
the New Left, politics is transformative: of values, experiences, under-
standings, and norms. New Public Law scholars have posed profound 
theoretical challenges to the traditional pluralist and modem Paretian-
welfarist view that an ideal public policy should simply mirror existing 
values of individual citizens. Such insights expose the constitutive role 
of law and the cultural dimensions more generally of law and policy. 
They also expand the potential sites on which public law thought 
might focus, for if policy and culture are mutually defining, the causes 
and consequences of policy are pervasive. In the words of Professors 
Eskridge and Peller, "[l]aw is part of a web of sociopolitical structures 
that are constitutive - and reconstitutive - of our community."5 
Yet when scholarship turns to concrete policy recommendations, this 
insight seems difficult to domesticate. 
In this essay, I want to try to build on it in order to suggest forms a 
genuinely New Public Law scholarship might take. My aim is to em-
brace much of what New Public Law thought has urged: the margin-
ality of common law doctrine or judicial decisionmaking; the need to 
attend to profound disaffections with the modem regulatory state; an 
acceptance of the complex, dynamic relationship of public policy and 
private understandings; a recognition that public values are consti-
tuted not only at the grandest levels of policy formation, but also in 
the myriad microscopic day-to-day experiences of policy. In my view, 
taking these insights seriously requires neither new, formal, analytical 
definitions of law nor further abstract efforts to determine whether 
there "is" a New Public Law scholarship and how we might know it. 
Instead, incorporating these developments ought to lead to immersion 
in the concrete structures of specific public programs and policymak-
ing techniques. Thus, this essay not only explores several contempo-
rary areas of policy concern, including welfare, medical care, pro bono 
legal services, and military conscription, but also looks more generally 
at the characteristic tools of current approaches to the making of pub-
lic policy. 
The perspective that emerges is organized around a theme that 
might be called the "unintended cultural consequences" of public pol-
5. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 1, at 748. 
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icy. Economic analysts have long been fond of pointing out various 
unintended instrumental consequences of government action. Many 
argue, for example, that regulating the price of housing to protect the 
poor will reduce the quantity and quality of affordable housing. But 
New Public Law scholars have suggested that law can interact in more 
complex and subtle ways with public and private understandings, 
norms, and ideals. If so, then some of these effects, too, can be unfore-
seen and unappreciated. Indeed, the very recommendations of econo-
mists, or some public law scholars, designed to avoid the now more 
familiar unintended, instrumental consequences of policy, might them-
selves tum out to have unintended cultural consequences. We might 
then conceive of the need for tradeoffs between these different, unin-
tended, dynamic effects. 
The distinction I have in mind is this: Some goals of public policy 
can be achieved only through certain self-understandings and more 
widely shared social understandings; these understandings are consti-
tutive of the goal itself. For example, if one goal of civil rights legisla-
tion is the social attainment of individual dignity for members of 
previously oppressed groups, only actions consistent with cultural un-
derstandings of dignity can realize this goal. The relevant aims cannot 
be reached except by affecting these understandings. (This is one rea-
son the interpretation of many legal norms ought to change over time, 
for the cultural understandings through which some norms work 
themselves evolve. If understandings of dignity shift, legal norms 
whose purpose is assuring dignity must be reinterpreted to remain 
faithful to their original aim.) But other policy goals can be achieved 
in ways independent of such mental states. For example, increasing 
the hours of legal service devoted to the indigent or the quantity of 
welfare benefits delivered to eligible recipients is a policy objective de-
finable largely apart from any self-understandings and cultural mean-
ings; we can tell whether these aims have been realized by looking at 
the quantity of goods delivered. By cultural consequences I mean the 
effects of public policy on social understandings, norms, and mean-
ings. Instrumental consequences, in contrast, are produced through 
causal processes that do not need to work through the subjective expe-
rience of such understandings. 6 
My claim is that cultural consequences are a significant, but fre-
6. The concerns I raise do address the effects of policy choices and for that reason others 
might be inclined to describe them as "merely" one more type of instrumental consequence. I do 
not view much as hinging on this choice of language, though I offer two reasons for the distinc· 
tion I draw. First, "cultural consequences" highlights specific, distinct, difficult to express mech-
anisms (social understandings) through which the effects of policy can work. Second, on the 
alternative description, all policy concerns become instrumentalist; that concept itself becomes so 
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quently ignored, dimension of public policy. Instead, exclusive con-
cern for instrumental outcomes dominates modem policy and public 
law thought. Yet many of the goals of public programs are better con-
ceived, at least in part, in cultural terms. And even where goals are 
purely instrumental, the cultural consequences of the means selected 
to pursue those instrumental goals can undermine their realization. 
Professors Eskridge and Peller view this Symposium as a sign that 
New Public Law scholarship is at a "critical stage."7 And Professor 
Shane, looking primarily at constitutional law, wonders whether any 
emerging, distinct "ideological commitments" as to the point of gov-
ernmental activity characterize a New Public Law system of thought. 8 
These two observations, in my view, are linked. As legal scholarship 
makes yet another of its post-Realist attempts to come to terms with 
the modem regulatory state, a central question is whether this work 
will simply replicate the methods of analysis and modes of thought 
characteristic of instrumentally oriented policy science. If so, there 
will be no New Public Law thought, only a disciplinary reshuffiing of 
technocratic analysis from economics departments and public policy 
schools to the law schools. But New Public Law scholarship has al-
ready generated the foundational insights upon which a distinct New 
Public Law vision of "the point" and consequences of public policy 
might be built. Developing these insights in the context of specific 
public programs, a task to which this essay attempts to contribute, will 
determine whether legal scholarship can offer a conception of the 
grounding of law in deeper cultural understandings - a genuinely 
New Public Law. 
By focusing on the theme of "unintended cultural consequences," I 
mean only to name and make self-conscious what I think is nascent 
but obscured in much New Public Law scholarship. This essay offers 
three variations on that central theme, played out through a number of 
disparate, specific public programs and policy issues. No special sig-
expansive as to be oflittle use (much in the way "self-interest" becomes tautological and vacuous 
in the hands of some economists). 
More generally, descriptions, categories, and concepts are meaningful only insofar as they are 
pragmatically useful in navigating our way through social, moral, and political space. In that 
sense, I believe the distinction between instrumental and cultural consequences captures real 
differences difficult to articulate but important to notice. Whatever the label, contemporary pub-
lic policy and public law thought seems dominated by a focus on one set of concerns; my aim is 
to reorient attention to significant concerns seemingly neglected at present. To the extent distin-
guishing instrumental from cultural consequences makes it easier to see certain obscured con-
cerns - to the extent the contrast more incisively illuminates particular aspects of policy - the 
distinction serves its purposes. 
7. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 1, at 707. 
8. Shane, Structure, Relationship, Ideology, or How Would We Know a "New Public Law" If 
We Saw It?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 837, 864 (1991). 
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nificance lies in the particular three ways I have chosen to elaborate 
this theme; I do not view them as the most pressing concerns a cultur-
ally oriented New Public Law might address. Nor can my treatment 
of particular problems in any sense be complete. I hope only to be 
suggestive, sketching enough of an outline for the theme of unintended 
cultural consequences to provoke interest at this "critical stage" in 
such a reorientation of New Public Law scholarship. 
I. THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF POLICY I: THE MEANING OF 
DISTRIBUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND PUBLIC PROGRAMS 
Public benefits, such as welfare or various types of social insurance, 
can be distributed through widely varying institutional and social 
structures. Similarly, those who provide public services, such as pro 
bono legal work or military duty, c~ be induced to do so through a 
variety of means, including economic incentives, centralized state 
commands, social and professional norms, and the like. These alterna-
tive structures and techniques have traditionally been assessed largely 
in terms of what might be called their output capacity: how effectively 
and efficiently they deliver benefits to the intended recipients. If legal 
assistance would be provided to a larger num~er of indigent clients 
most cost effectively through a particular type of pro bono system, 
that system should be preferred; if a particular distributional structure 
can effectively deliver welfare benefits at least public cost, policy ana-
lysts advocate that structure. 
On this view, structures of distribution are important primarily in 
terms of their capacity to deliver the relevant goods. Yet the choice 
among alternative structures of distribution is meaningful for other 
reasons. Like many policies, this choice is of consequence not only 
instrumentally, but culturally: such structures play a role in creating 
social understandings and fostering particular types of social relation-
ships. Defining the effectiveness of public programs requires consider-
ing these consequences, in part because of their independent 
significance, and in part because they, in turn, influence the instrumen-
tal effectiveness of policy. 
The causal relationship I have in mind between public programs 
and social understandings can best be observed through study of con-
crete programs. But a few initial, abstract observations can help frame 
the analysis. First, implicit in all public programs and institutions are 
norms that inform their design and aims. By expressing and embody-
ing such norms, policy outcomes necessarily consecrate certain values 
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and exclude others.9 The public validation of certain norms contrib-
utes to a broader political culture characterized by those particular 
understandings and commitments. Second, the· experience of policy 
touches not just the recipients of benefits and services, but providers 
and distributors as well; workplace experiences socialize adults into 
the values and goals of particular institutions, roles, and programs.10 
The structures of public programs define norms concerning the appro-
priate relationship of workers to each other, to superiors, to program 
beneficiaries, to citizens more generally, to the state, and even to 
norms themselves (are administrators to be distrusted, hence cabined 
in with categorical, rigid, rule-like norms, or trusted as capable 
enough to be provided more open-ended standards and goals to ad-
minister). These understandings are central to the ways formal public 
policy will be implemented and translated into actual experience.11 
Third, these programs not only provide goods and services to benefi-
ciaries, but mediate and construct relationships between them and the 
state; indeed, for many individuals, such programs will be their princi-
9. Hence efforts to defend the liberal state as generally "neutral" among competing moral 
ideas or values cannot be sustained. Political institutions and policy choices necessarily reflect a 
commitment between competing substantive ideals and values, even if those values are familiar 
liberal ones of tolerance, pluralism, individual autonomy, or equality. Strongly communitarian 
cultures typically illuminate most sharply the role of public choice in constructing cultural un-
derstandings, both because of greater social self-consciousness regarding the role of these under-
standings and the contrast such cultures provide to our own society. For example, although 
Amish culture is often viewed as hostile to all forms of modern technology, in fact, complex 
communal decisions are continuously made about which technologies can be adopted consistent 
with preservation of the culture's sense of its own integrity - decisions that cannot be reduced to 
narrow, instrumental calculations of need. Kidder & Hostetler, Managing Ideologies: Harmony 
as Ideology in Amish and Japanese Societies, 24 LAW & SocY. REv. 895 (1990). Modern, liberal, 
pluralistic cultures similarly express and create values through their public choices, even if this 
process is more obscured to its participants. See Yack, Liberalism and its Communitarian Crit-
ics: Does Liberal Practice "Live Down" to Liberal Theory, in CoMMUNITY IN AMERICA 147, 147-
69 (C. Reynolds & R. Norman eds. 1988). For the argument that liberalism need not even 
theoretically be understood to require state neutrality between competing conceptions of the 
good or between competing moral ideals in general, see Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can 
Promote Moral Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 1991). 
10. For studies of the ways in which work environments are important sites of socialization, 
learning, and preference formation, see PoLmCAL LEARNING IN ADULTHOOD 89-265 (R. Sigel 
ed. 1989). For an argument that private employment structures and incentives shape women's 
preferences for different types of work, see Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: 
Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack 
of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1749 (1990). 
11. For one intriguing case study of this process, see Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: 
Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SocY. REv. 1041 (1990). 
Calavita argues that the failure of recent immigration law amendments to ensure meaningful 
employer compliance with restrictions on hiring illegal aliens stems from more than the fact that 
white-collar employers take Holmes' "bad man," positivistic stance toward the costs and benefits 
of noncompliance - a well-known general phenomenon in the corporate crime area. Equally 
important, in her view; are understandings the statute itself has fostered as to what constitutes 
compliance, which lead employers to view themselves as complying even when they act in ways 
directly at odds with the statute's basic objectives. 
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pal point of contact with the state. Thus, the structure of public pro-
grams can influence the ways in which program beneficiaries perceive 
themselves, broader social relations, and their relationship to the state 
- a point recognized, for example, in procedural due process litera-
ture from the 1970s emphasizing the noninstrumental role of 
predeprivation notice and hearings.12 
Public programs, in other words, do not just do things in the sense 
of providing benefits or offering services. They also mean something, 
whether this meaning is talked about in terms of their expressive char-
acter, their role in sustaining and creating a particular public culture, 
or the way in which understandings of public programs directly influ-
ences their implementation. Concern for the meanings of public pro-
grams might be bolstered by citation to a traditional source of 
validation in law, the authority of the past: the Framers of the Consti-
tution were absolutely obsessed with the consequences of government 
action and structure on public understandings, personal character, and 
social relationships.13 
Contemporary obsessions run in other directions. The principal 
concern of modern policy science, or economic approaches to regula-
tory policy, seems exclusively to be the instrumental, end-state effec-
tiveness of public programs. Partially in response to these concerns, a 
central development of modem policy is what might be called the 
"contractualization" of public programs. By contractualization, I 
mean a policy permitting individuals to contract their way out 
through various means (payment of taxes, payment of others to pro-
vide services) from direct participation in public programs, where do-
ing so arguably promotes more efficient or cost-effective delivery of the 
relevant public goods. 
By focusing on the unintended cultural consequences of public pol-
icy, a New Public Law scholarship might assess the social costs from 
the current contractualization of public programs.14 Even if this 
12. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus For Administrative Adjudication in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 
(1976); Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, XVIII NOMOS 
126 (1977). 
13. See R. WIEBE, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 35·67 (1984); G. Wooo, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 91-125 (1969). The brilliance of De To-
queville's sociological insights into the workings of American democracy in the Jacksonian pe-
riod resides precisely in his subtle appreciation of these complex dynamics between public law, 
cultural understandings, and material consequences. See, in particular, his discussion of the cul-
tural and material consequences of democratic laws of inheritance. A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA 48-SS, so (H. Reeves trans. 1945) ("The law of equal distribution 
proceeds by two methods: by acting upon things, it acts upon persons; by influencing persons, it 
affects things."). 
14. Emphasizing this dimension of public choice is the aim of Binder, Beyond Criticism, 155 
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method promotes more effective delivery of the relevant benefits, its 
cultural consequences make contractualizing inappropriate for some 
programs. In this section, I suggest that might be so for certain forms 
of military conscription, mandatory pro bono requirements, and wel-
fare distribution. 
A. Military Service 
The choice of means for allocating responsibility to provide mili-
tary service is a poignant and therefore easily recognizable illustration 
of the ways in which the structure of public programs reflects and 
shapes cultural understandings. Looking at the history of public 
choices in this area illuminates the kinds of cultural consequences pol-
icy can bring about and the way those consequences can, after the fact, 
be observed. The stakes in public policy choices are never more 
profound: which citizens will be subjected to the risk of injury or 
death in order to provide the central public good of collective security. 
And a wide array of means exists for making these choices: market 
allocation systems (either in the form of paid volunteers or conscrip-
tion with an option to buy out from serving); politically accountable 
systems, which can take diverse forms including conscription with 
narrow, effectiveness-related exemptions (exclude only those unfit to 
serve); or conscription with broader policy-related exemptions (ex-
clude those who can perform more "worthy" roles elsewhere in soci-
ety); or purely private systems, such as voluntary service without 
monetary compensation. Thus the choice among alternatives becomes 
symbolic public action of the most tragic and powerful sort. 15 Riots 
can be sparked from the choice among these options and, in this coun-
try, have been. 
But noting the dramaturgical dimension of these choices still un-
derstates their cultural significance. For these choices profoundly af-
fect not just those immediately involved, but larger social and political 
understandings. Because the stakes are high, the structure of military 
service expresses, but more importantly, shapes norms of social and 
political relationship more broadly. Conceptions of equality, obliga-
tion, fairness, authority, and the like are constructed in part by these 
U. CHI. L. REv. 888 (1988). Although I reject certain claims Binder miikes with regard to the 
indeterminacy of defining the instrumental consequences policy brings about, his arguments have 
helped considerably in formulating my own. 
15. Michael Walzer describes soldiering as "socially necessary, at least sometimes; and when 
it is, the necessity is visible and dramatic." For these reasons, Walzer argues that mandatory 
conscription has a moral purpose beyond providing the substantial troops used in modern war-
fare, that purpose being, in his words, "to universalize or randomize the risks of war over a given 
generation of young men." M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 169 (1983). 
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choices. Women who seek the right to participate in combat duty 
have recognized as much, 16 as have African-Americans, for whom 
shared participation in the risk of injury and death has played a role in 
political transformations such as abolition and desegregation.17 More 
generally, the history of military-service policies reveals the cultural 
significance of public programs, for it involves repeated shifts in the 
structure of military service, including periods in which service was 
contractualized, 18 followed by visible and intense public responses. 19 
No national draft existed in the United States before the Civil War. 
The War of 1812 with the British, and the Mexican-American War in 
1845, were fought with volunteers and members of state militias. 
Although early Civil War recruitment efforts generated more than 
400,000 Union volunteers, Congress soon passed the Militia Act of 
1862, instituting the United States' first draft. The Act contained a 
provision authorizing a draftee to hire a substitute, thus contractualiz-
ing service by permitting a citizen to comply by offering another in his 
place. Economic analyses might suggest the efficiency of such a provi-
sion:20 it permits Pareto-superior private transactions; arguably those 
16. The Supreme Court has upheld against constitutional challenge the exclusion of women 
from current draft registration requirements on the rationale that current policy precludes wo-
men from serving in combat duty. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
17. See, e.g., E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 8-10 (1988) (summarizing individual and polit-
ical ramifications from role of black soldiers during the Civil War). In England, the entire wel-
fare state itself emerged as a response to World War II: social policies developed during the War 
were implemented in its aftermath to provide general security against illness, unemployment, 
disability, old age, and poverty. Indeed, the term "welfare state" first emerged in England in this 
period to contrast English public philosophy and commitments with those of the Nazi "warfare 
state." Amenta & Skocpol, Redefining the New Deal: World War II and the Development of 
Social Provision in the United States, in THE PoLmcs OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 81, 82 (1988) (quoting Flora & Heidenheimer, The Historical Core and Changing Bound-
aries of the Welfare State, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF WELFARE STATES IN EUROPE AND 
AMERICA 19 (1981)). 
18. See infra introduction to Part II. 
19. The particular history of Civil War conscription and military service policies is drawn 
from E. MURDOCK, ONE MILLION MEN: THE CIVIL WAR DRAFT IN THE NORTH (1971); E. 
MURDOCK, PATRIOTISM LIMITED 1862-1865: THE CIVIL WAR DRAFT AND THE BOUNTY SYS· 
TEM (1967); Earnhart, Commutation: Democratic or Undemocratic?. 12 CIVIL WAR HIST. 132 
(1966); Geary, Civil War Conscription in the North: An Historiographical Review, 32 CIVIL WAR 
HIST. 208 (1986); Levine, Draft Evasion in the North During the Civil War, 1863-1865, 61 J. AM. 
HIST. 816 (1981); Murdock, Was it a "Poor Man's Fight"?, 10 CIVIL WAR HIST. 241 (1964). For 
the more general history of conscription and military service in the United States, I have relied 
upon G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 157-67 (1978). 
20. For a recent argument by an economist that it is more efficient to raise an army through 
an all-volunteer system rather than conscription, see T. Ross, Raising an Army: A Positive 
Theory of Military Recruitment, at 2-3 (unpublished draft dated Dec. 6, 1990) ("By selecting 
people at random, a lottery-style conscription fails to provide the social cost minimizing set of 
candidates .... [T]he idea that there are serious allocative inefficiencies associated with conscrip-
tion must be ancient."); see also id. at 7 ("Conscription puts the 'wrong' people in the military; 
wrong in the sense that they will not represent the opportunity cost minimizing set of soldiers."). 
Ross does acknowledge, however, that efficiency might not be the only concern appropriately 
informing this choice. 
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more able or committed to serving will end up doing so; those to 
whom the value of pursuing other ends or obligations is highest, such 
as heads of families, will remain available for those pursuits. In the 
actual historical and political context, however, such efficiency-based 
arguments failed to find public acceptance.21 According to Calabresi 
and Bobbitt, public reaction to this draft was "immediate and unfavor-
able. "22 Voluntary enlistment ceased. Public hostility centered on the 
hiring-out provision, which induced a market in substitutes with prices 
as high as $1500 in some places. 
In response, Congress passed a new Act the following year.23 
Again, contractualization out of service remained an option, but this 
time through a flat fee of $300 set by statute.24 Setting a flat fee elimi-
nated the trade in substitutes; the money from exemption payments 
was to be used to encourage voluntary enlistment and reenlistment. 
With the fee set at this greatly reduced level, exemption was also 
brought within broader reach.25 Again, efficiency arguments might 
justify this structure. And again, but with much greater violence, this 
way of structuring military service generated vehement public resist-
ance. Draft riots in New York City led to more than 1000 deaths, and 
in Midwestern States, officers conducting the draft were murdered, 
records destroyed, and draft resisters fired upon by federal troops. By 
the end of the War, the possibility of contracting out of military ser-
vice had been eliminated. Evidently the open pricing of military ser-
vice had come to violate emerging cultural and political 
understandings concerning the meaning of citizenship and the nature 
of American egalitarianism. 
The subsequent history of military service reveals a variety of other 
approaches. World War I invoked conscription, with some exemp-
tions, including ones for those in certain occupations and men with 
dependents. Among the pool of eligible men, aged 21-31, selection 
occurred through lottery. This draft is viewed as having successfully 
21. At the level of theory, the efficiency based arguments discussed here are indeterminate, as 
such arguments frequently are, for one can also imagine efficiency arguments against these sorts 
of contractualization provisions. The quality of service might be lower from those willing to be 
bought off to serve: they might be less loyal, less competent, less integrated into society and 
hence Jess willing to follow commands, and the like. 
22. CALABRESI & Boaarrr, supra note 19, at 159 (quoting Friedman, United States Compul-
sory Service Systems, in CoMPULSORY SERVICE SYSTEMS 9 (1968)). 
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731. 
24. Technically, this was an annual fee, payment of which only "commuted" service obliga-
tions for one draft year. See G. CALABRESI & P. Boaarrr, supra note 19, at 160. 
25. This fee still appears, however, to have been the equivalent of about one-year's wages for 
the average workingman. E. MURDOCK, PATRIOTISM LIMITED 1862-1865: THE CIVIL WAR 
DRAFr AND THE BOUNTY SYSTEM 9 (1967). 
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realized its aims, including substantial registration, with that result 
generally attributed to perceptions of the "scrupulous fairness" of the 
system and its implementation.26 Yet given the decline of traditional 
family-oriented lifestyles and the social legitimacy of more individual-
istically oriented ways of life, a draft today exempting those with de-
pendents might not be as politically acceptable.27 By World War II, 
voluntary enlistments were severely restricted and those registered 
were called in order of birth rather than through lottery. At the time 
of the Vietnam War, the conscription system had evolved toward 
broad eligibility standards with an elaborate, somewhat vague set of 
deferments. The manipulability of the criteria for deferment by local 
draft boards and lawyers, as well as controversy over many of the sub-
stantive criteria for deferment, generated substantial conflict over the 
legitimacy of the draft. 
By 1973, this conflict propelled movement toward an essentially all 
volunteer army. To generate such a force, pay at the lower enlisted 
levels was increased substantially. Thus, for over 100 years beginning 
with the Civil War, conscription policy responded to public pressure 
by eliminating earlier traditions which had permitted contractualizing 
the obligation to serve; yet today, military service is structured entirely 
around the concept of contractualization. The difference is between a 
system permitting contracting out of required service and one struc-
tured around "voluntary" contracting in to serve; this difference is not 
a mere formal one, for significant support for the all-voluntary mili-
tary since 1977 suggests the difference carries real moral and cultural 
weight (in general, what constitutes a "mere" formal difference among 
public policies and what is regarded as a "genuine" substantive differ-
ence is not inherent, but rather itself rooted in cultural 
understandings). 
Yet social meanings of public programs continue to evolve and the 
legitimacy of this distinction is now being called into question. Con-
tracting in as the means of filling military needs generated less concern 
when the all-volunteer force served in essence as a public employment 
and job training program, with little risk of actual military combat 
duty. But as the latent threat of personal sacrifice always associated 
with military service has recently resurfaced, the skewed socioeco-
nomic and racial distributions in a hired military are beginning to un-
dermine the legitimacy of current policy. The meaning and dangers of 
military service themselves have changed, with the result that the cul-
26. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBITI, supra note 19, at 161. 
27. Indeed, by 1971, paternity deferments began to be phased out, Exec. Order No. 11,527, 3 
C.F.R. 925, 926 (1966-1970), a process cut short by the end of the draft in 1973. 
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tural consequences of the means for eliciting service are also beginning 
to shift. 
The history of military-'service policies and of public responses to 
them provides a starting point for considering the cultural conse-
quences of public law. Historical perspectives are central to this task 
for two reasons. First, predicting cultural consequences ex ante re-
quires making subtle judgments about the social understandings par-
ticular policies are likely to have, as well as the further ramifications of 
those understandings; for this reason, no formal, axiomatic "laws" of 
cultural consequences can be developed. The necessary judgments 
must build upon historical appreciation of the kinds of understandings 
past policies have tended to create. Second, evaluating cultural conse-
quences ex post cannot readily be accomplished through the quantita-
tive, materially oriented measures used to gauge instrumental effects. 
Historical perspectives, which seek more broadly to capture the mean-
ings and public understandings associated with past actions, thus be-
come an important source of empirical information for assessing the 
cultural consequences of earlier choices. 
More generally, appreciating these kinds of consequences is diffi-
cult; historical proof is the most convincing means .of overcoming 
skepticism. In the context of military-service policies, the stakes are so 
high and the history of public reactions so dramatic that the cultural 
dimensions involved are hard to miss. But this history only accentu-
ates the kinds of cultural consequences regularly, if less dramatically, 
implicated in public choice. Recognizing the centrality of these conse-
quences opens possibilities for reconceiving public programs - as I 
now try to suggest by questioning current methods of distributing pro 
bono legal services and public financial assistance. 
B. Pro Bono Legal Services 
The decline in federal financial support of legal services during the 
1980s has led a number of state bar associations and judicial officials to 
renew emphasis on the organized bar's responsibility to provide such 
services. After aggressive appeals by the Chief Judge of Maryland's 
highest court, for example, Maryland has tripled, at least temporarily, 
the number of lawyers voluntarily willing to provide pro bono services 
to the poor.28 Other states, such as North Dakota, Massachusetts, 
Hawaii, and Illinois, are considering imposing mandatory pro bono 
requirements. 29 
28. Chambers, Lawyers Find Loopholes in Pro Bono, Natl. L.J., Oct. l, 1990, at 13, 14. 
29. Final Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, Committee to Improve the 
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The most radical developments to date, however, are taking place 
in New York, which is contemplating a mandatory pro bono require-
ment for the state's 88,000 lawyers, that requirement to be imposed 
through administrative regulation of the New York Court of Appeals. 
As a prelude to such a requirement, an officially appointed commis-
sion has reported out a detailed proposed structure for the program. 
For now, Chief Judge Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals 
has suspended adoption of the commission's recommendations for two 
years, leaving them hanging over the organized bar in an effort to in-
duce serious voluntary compliance efforts. Adoption of a mandatory 
program somewhere seems more likely today than ever; such a pro-
gram would constitute a major new policy initiative for the redistribu-
tion of important social goods. The New York commission's report 
represents the most detailed attempt to structure a mandatory pro 
bona program. But from the perspective developed in this essay, the 
proposed structure, which might stand as a model for other states, 
ignores important cultural dimensions of mandatory pro bono 
programs. 
As proposed, all lawyers admitted and registered in New York 
would be required every two years to provide a minimum of forty 
hours of work qualifying as pro bono. The scope of proposed coverage 
is broad: government lawyers, law professors, legal services and pub-
lic interest lawyers are included along with corporate lawyers; only 
judges and nonpracticing or retired lawyers are exempt. But the broad 
obligation of individual service is qualified by two substantial excep-
tions. First, solo practitioners or those in firms of fewer than ten law-
yers (who comprise nearly 70% of New York lawyers) can satisfy 
their obligations by paying $50 per hour of required service to an eligi-
ble legal services or public interest organization. Second, lawyers in 
firms or others organized together for this purpose can pool their 
hours and delegate their service obligation to some member; the com-
mission calls this "group service," which in fact signifies that some 
individuals can stand in for others. Jo 
Both these exceptions contractualize the program by permitting in-
dividuals through purchase or hire to opt out of direct, personal par-
ticipation. The second exception, however, is more troubling than the 
first, for convincing policy justifications for the first might well be 
available: small business exemptions from regulatory requirements are 
Availability of Legal Services, 150-52 (1990) [hereinafter Final Report]; see also New York Panel 
Urges Lawyers to Aid the Poor, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1989, at 1, col. 1. 
30. These exceptions do not apply to lawyers who have been admitted to practice for less 
than two years. Final Report, supra note 29, at 58-59. 
February 1991] Cultural Consequences of Public Policy 949 
common and not typically troubling.31 Contractualizing public distri-
butional programs does not inherently corrupt them; everything de-
pends on the justifications for permitting particular forms of opting 
out and the effects of doing so in particular contexts. But the tempta-
tions to permit contracting out are always strong, given that the bene-
fits - more efficient allocations of service responsibilities, as viewed 
from the subjective perspective of participants - will seem obvious. 
And the costs of indulging this temptation will often be obscured, for 
they lie in the much more difficult to articulate, but very real, domain 
of social understandings and cultural experiences of public programs. 
Just such a misconceived tradeoff seems to underlie the exception 
for those who delegate their obligations to others. Perhaps "group 
service" will more effectively serve clients in the most immediate sense 
of providing assistance. Abstract efficiency arguments for this view 
can easily be marshalled. Permitting voluntary redistribution of ser-
vice obligations through private negotiation might put at the service of 
indigent clients those lawyers with the most experience, knowledge, or 
commitment to the task. Of course, these redistributions will not be 
voluntary in any meaningful sense, for as the commission recognizes, 
delegations will likely reflect existing relationships of power and au-
thority: associates will find themselves facing offers from senior part-
ners they cannot refuse. Even so, the efficiency of less-than-voluntary 
delegations can still be defended; perhaps the time of senior partners is 
more valuable in some social (as well as the obvious economic) sense, 
so that opportunity costs are minimized if pro bono work is delegated 
to less senior attorneys. Yet just as these sorts of arguments eventually 
were rejected in the context of the military draft, they should be re-
jected here. 
The meaning of pro bono work, the perception of the mandatory 
pro bono program, and the professional self-understanding of lawyers 
will be differently constructed by a program that prohibits rather than 
permits hiring out.32 Moreover, the policy objectives of such a pro-
gram, which transcend the immediate instrumental end of delivering 
31. Without examining information concerning the projected practical burdens these 
mandatory pro bono requirements would impose on solo practitioners or smaller firms, the per-
suasiveness of these justifications cannot intelligibly be assessed. Such lawyers might well be the 
most appropriate for pro bono tasks, since they might have the most experience with the sorts of 
cases and issues likely to involve indigent clients; the burdens on smaller practices of 20 hours 
per year of pro bono service might be greatly exaggerated. 
32. New York's deference to existing private preferences, and its failure to appreciate fully 
the way such preferences can be shaped by the structure of public programs themselves, is re-
flected in the following defense of the group-service concept: "The group services concept ac-
knowledges that some attorneys are more personally or professionally inclined ... to provide pro 
bono services .... " Final Report, supra note 29, at 58. 
950 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:936 
enhanced legal services in the short run, are likely to be eroded where 
hiring out is permitted. 
Pro bono work can be satisfying, but is often romanticized, and 
mandatory duties in particular might be experienced by many as hard, 
tedious, frustrating or boring; yet New York has concluded it is so-
cially necessary work to be done. Presumably the state aims to en-
hance the perceived social and professional value of such difficult 
work, for further voluntary commitments beyond the minimal state-
imposed requirements will be necessary to meet the legal needs of the 
poor. Such aims are appropriate, indeed central, for public programs: 
the way in which various activities are valued is a matter of social 
understandings (beyond those embodied in market norms) and the 
structure of public programs partly constructs those understandings. 
But confining pro bono obligations to those of lowest professional sta-
tus, as the group-service exemption is likely to do, will devalue the 
work professionally. Keeping the work out of sight in a ghetto of the 
least powerful makes it merely one more burden to be endured, one 
more hoop to jump through while waiting ascent up the professional 
hierarchy. Indeed, escape from pro bono work might mark the course 
of that ascent. 
Beyond enhancing the dignity and value of pro bono work, New 
York also explicitly seeks to transform norms of professional duty. 
According to the New York report, "public interest service by lawyers 
should be thought of, not as an individual charity, but as a profes-
sional duty."33 But imposing the formal requirement of serving, while 
permitting the hiring out of service, is not likely to create any trans-
formed social sense of professional duty. Shared, direct experience, 
not the distant formality of indirect, legally validated participation, is 
necessary. Norms are more likely to be internalized when embodied in 
personal performance - not when performance can be shirked off to 
those lower in an organizational hierarchy. 
Finally, though perhaps paradoxically, support for New York's 
program might well be greater the more widely shared its burdens. 
Where the state imposes obligations to perform socially necessary but 
hard work, resentment will likely be greater when the burdens are dis-
tributed unequally. Resentment over these inequalities becomes re-
sentment of the program and the tasks themselves; the meaning of the 
work is onerous. If instead the burden of performing this work is dis-
tributed more broadly, the social meaning of providing it can shift as 
well. Legal assistance to the poor might be more likely to be exper-
33. Dean, Voluntary or Mandatory Service?, N.Y. L.J., May 21, 1990, at 3. 
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ienced as participation in a common professional and social project, a 
necessary cooperative enterprise to which everyone contributes an 
equal and equally meaningful share. 34 
Perhaps the gains in effective provision of legal services are worth 
these costs in social and professional understandings. But I doubt it. 
Given the emphasis on efficiency and the role of contractual arrange-
ments in our society, public policy analysts rarely appraise these costs 
with enough appreciation. Yet the structure of mandatory pro bono 
obligations is likely to color not only norms of professional responsi-
bility but the meaning and experience of pro bono work itself. 
C. Welfare and the Distribution of Public Benefits 
Mandatory pro bono proposals raise focused, discrete policy ques-
tions and, in their currently contractualized structure, strikingly re-
semble early conscription efforts. Conclusions about their likely 
cultural consequences are therefore easier to suggest. But once atten-
tion is generally directed toward these types of consequences, more 
complex public programs can also be reexamined. In addition, more 
obscured forms of contractualizing public programs can be discerned, 
the cultural consequences of which need to be explored. This Section 
attempts to do so by uncovering the way in which current public-
assistance programs have become contractualized and by questioning 
the cultural effects of this choice. 35 
The national welfare state replaced something. Before public wel-
fare, communal organizations (religious organizations, almshouses), 
private philanthropies, and social structures provided assistance of 
various sorts to the poor. To be sure, problems abounded with these 
nonstate forms of provision to "paupers": complete gaps in coverage 
and unstable reliability; drastic inequalities in provision across differ-
ent communities; the creation of potentially degrading relationships of 
personal power and dependency. Nationalization and legalization of 
34. In slightly more formal language, we might describe lawyers as having initial, first-order 
preferences regarding pro bono work (these "preferences" might place it much lower in a law-
yer's ranking system than many other forms of work). But lawyers also have preferences to be 
respected members of the profession, which can lead to judgments about which of their initial 
preferences they ought to follow and which to revise. Norms of professional duty can shape 
these more basic initial preferences. Such norms are examples of what Cass Sunstein calls sec-
ond-order, or higher, preferences. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 1129 (1986). Because the way in which pro bono programs are structured will 
affect the understanding of what these higher norms are, those structures will also influence how 
lawyers view pro bono obligations, both mandatory and voluntary ones. 
35. The following discussion draws directly on Walzer, Socializing the Welfare State, in DE-
MOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 13 (A. Gutmann ed. 1988), whose ideas about welfare 
reform I seek to integrate into a more general theoretical framework for thinking about transfor-
mations in the way public policy is conceived and institutionalized. 
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welfare transformed it into a legal entitlement to be provided reliably 
across jurisdictional lines through impersonalized state structures. 
But the creation of a national welfare state was conceived as more 
than simply delivering needed assistance more effectively and fairly. It 
also expressed "a sense of the nation-state as a community committed 
to its citizens - or, more accurately, as a community constituted by 
citizens committed to one another. The welfare state was imagined as 
a systematic form of mutual assistance, replacing the unsystematic 
(and unreliable) forms that had existed before."36 Rather than seeing 
its role only instrumentally, we might view the welfare state as 
designed to embody a particular public philosophy and to aspire to the 
creation of a particular set of social relationships. 
Yet the structures that have evolved for distributing welfare might 
have unintentionally undermined these goals. The participation of 
most citizens in the collection and distribution of welfare is limited to 
the payment of taxes, with more palpable participation in providing 
actual benefits confined to a full-time, professionalized state bureau-
cracy. Paying taxes, rather than providing services or working with 
recipients, is a form of contractualizing public programs: while com-
plying with the relevant formal participation requirements, citizens in 
actual experience can effectively opt out. Payment of taxes is surely 
better than earlier Social Darwinist approaches to the poor, but it al-
lows most citizens to escape the meaning and effects of direct involve-
ment with the needy. The cultural consequences of welfare as 
currently distributed might further social atomization, rather than the 
hoped for strengthening of communal bonds. Worse, since national-
ized welfare distribution has partly displaced preexisting community 
structures for such provision,37 nationalizing distribution while cur-
tailing direct participation might have furthered the sense of social 
dissolution. 
Might dissatisfaction with the welfare state trace, at least to some 
extent, to the completely contractualized structure of current distribu-
tional arrangements? Although most contemporary public debate 
about the welfare system focuses on concerns about its incentive-alter-
ing effects on recipients, attending to the cultural consequences of who 
participates in providing benefits and in what ways might lead to re-
vised distributional structures that would sustain greater public sup-
36. Id. at 16. 
37. Western European'states, for example, have reportedly witnessed a decline in voluntary 
contributions of time, work, and financial contributions with the rise in state run welfare systems. 
As an extreme example, "friendly societies" once found in working-class areas, which provided 
forms of social security, have largely disappeared. P. GOSDEN, SELF-HELP: VOLUNTARY AS-
SOCIATIONS IN THE 19TH CENTURY (1973). 
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port for the welfare state. We might aim for a more decentralized, 
more widely participatory, less professionalized and state controlled 
welfare system. 3s 
Suppose this system were reconstituted to engage considerably 
more widespread, direct citizen participation through devotion of time 
and energy rather than money. This could be implemented in a vari-
ety of ways, such as creating incentives for participation, or a tempo-
rary national service program (as both conservatives and those on the 
left are increasingly proposing39), or mixtures of voluntary/compul-
sory/incentive-induced participation. To make such participation at-
tractive and meaningful, more power to administer the system might 
need to be devolved to local welfare bodies. Effectively doing so might 
require less rigid, uniform national eligibility standards, or at least less 
intensive national supervision of the implementation of such stan-
dards. Perhaps the meaning of welfare and the welfare state might 
shift; social relationships, as well, would likely be affected. Citizens 
might come to feel more of a shared stake in public assistance pro-
38. See, e.g., N. GILBERT, CAPITALISM AND THE WELFARE STATE 168-70 (1983). These 
proposals might in a very general way be viewed as an analogue in the public assistance and 
insurance sphere to Richard Stewart's conceptions for reconstituting the regulatory structures 
through which environmental regulation is developed and enforced. See Stewart, Reconstitutive 
Law, 46 Mo. L. REv. 86 (1986). Stewart's work is one example of New Public Law scholarship 
that does seek to come to terms with the substantive direction and content of public programs 
and structures. Although Peller and Eskridge correctly note that Stewart's emphasis is institu-
tional, and to that extent a reflection of earlier Legal Process era concerns, see Peller & Eskridge, 
supra note 1, at 732-33, a progressive and realistic philosophy of public law scholarship ought to 
recognize the ways in which institutional structures influence both the substantive content of 
policy and the social meaning of public programs. 
Indeed, Peller and Eskridge's critiques of this sort of New Public Law scholarship seem ironi-
cally misplaced. The obsessions of Legal Process era scholarship with allocating decisionmaking 
authority to appropriate institutional structures, already assumed to exist and be in place, have 
been properly attacked over the past 20 years. The era's institutional competence assumptions 
complacently viewed processes of decisionmaking as capable of being designed in line with wide-
spread social consensus (which existing institutions were treated as already reflecting), and capa-
ble of remaining neutral with respect to substantive outcomes. But the response to critiques of 
these assumptions should not be complete repudiation of institutional design concerns in order to 
focus directly and exclusively on substantive questions concerning the content of public policies. 
Institutional design or the structure of public policy programs is itself a principal vehicle through 
which substantive values can be realized - indeed, this might be viewed as one of the central 
interpretations of the critical onslaught against Legal Process thought. Some of the most radical 
of these critiques, in fact, take just such an institutional and process oriented form. See, e.g., 
Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory- and Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981). New 
Public Law scholarship that offers reconceived public institutions or structures for distributing 
public benefits and services, when done with self-conscious efforts to promote certain substantive 
ends, themselves acknowledged to be subject to political conflict and disagreement, ought to be 
welcomed as a real contribution, rather than viewed as mere warmed over Legal Process thought 
for its focus on institutions and processes. 
39. See, e.g., w. BUCKLEY, GRATITUDE: REFLECTIONS ON WHAT WE OWE TO OUR 
COUNTRY 21 (1990) ("The idea of national service needs to be popularized."); Selznick, The Idea 
of a Communitarian Morality, 15 CALIF. L. REV. 445, 456 (1987) ("many communitarian liber-
als - I among them - believe that a properly organized program of compulsory national service 
would be good for the country and for those who would serve"). 
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grams. Recipients might feel less trapped in a dense maze of imper-
sonalized rules bureaucratically administered by overburdened state 
workers. State-structured public assistance might generally be exper-
ienced as something more akin to now lost communal networks that 
genuinely expressed and created a world of mutual recognition and 
assistance. 
I am mindful of a host of questions such proposals spawn. The 
structure of the current welfare system is a response in part to genuine 
problems with prior public and private means of offering assistance to 
the needy. Seriously considering the sort of structural changes barely 
sketched here would require assessing a number of possible costs. De-
centralization and less intrusive national supervision might open up 
unacceptable possibilities for personal discretion, exploitation, and ine-
quality in the administration of benefits. Yet if not accompanied by 
considerable scope for personal autonomy and flexibility, broadening 
participation in benefit administration might breed resentment and 
backlash against public benefit programs. Perhaps the costs of such 
proposals would not be worth the gain in social understandings and 
relationships. Perhaps such proposals cannot be practically imple-
mented. Perhaps the hoped for gains are merely utopian fantasies. 
At the least, though, a substantively oriented, genuinely New Pub-
lic Law scholarship - one attuned to the general cultural conse-
quences rather than simply the immediate instrumental ends of public 
programs - might begin developing answers to such questions. Once 
cultural consequences are brought into focus, methods to explore them 
must include not only culturally informed case studies, but historical 
and comparative ones as well, for these consequences turn on the so-
cial meaning of public action, which make them functions of specific 
contexts, histories, and contingencies. At the same time, normative 
work will also be required: How should we assess needs for tradeoffs 
that might emerge between these broader concerns and more tradi-
tional ones of delivering goods and services effectively? Until public 
law thought is reoriented toward these questions, though, policy will 
remain oddly detached from its own meaning and effects. 
II. THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF POLICY II: VALUES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND THE CULTURAL FAILINGS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES 
The cultural matrix of public policy is generally ignored when 
traditional cost-benefit analyses are applied to determine the appropri-
ate extent of regulating environmental, workplace, and other risks to 
health and safety. Any acceptable approach to policymaking or moral 
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choice, of course, will need to take consequences into account and in 
that sense consider costs and benefits. The crucial question is how dif-
ferent approaches engage in this process - which considerations de-
termine what counts as a cost and benefit, who has the power to make 
those determinations, and, once costs and benefits are defined, how 
comparisons between them are made. The traditional cost-benefit 
techniques of public policy analysts exist as distinct tools of policy 
because they rest on specific answers to these moral and political ques-
tions. 40 Many criticisms of these techniques are by now familiar and I 
do not intend to replay them. But deeper and less familiar concerns 
remain to be expressed, for the inherent structure of cost-benefit analy-
ses does violence to cultural understandings that public policy ought 
to respect. For those concerned with the cultural consequences of 
public policy, articulating these concerns - and conceiving new insti-
tutional structures for making policy responsive to them - stands as a 
central task. 
Cost-benefit analysis has long been charged with understating the 
benefit side of government action. These benefits typically include 
40. The cost-benefit approaches used in policy analysis with which I am familiar include 
commitments to at least one of the following propositions: 
(1) That costs and benefits should be measured in terms of willingness to pay; 
(2) That the various kinds and types of benefits or costs can be aggregated along a single, 
common dimension and quantitatively expressed in a common numerical value; 
(3) That costs and benefits can then be commensurated and compared through this com-
mon numerical value; 
(4) That distributional effects of policy choices can be put to the side; 
(5) That all "real" costs and benefits must be taken into account without regard to the 
reasons people have for viewing something as a cost or benefit (that preferences, without 
regard to the reasons and justifications for them, are all to be counted equally); 
(6) That the same public priorities or rankings of values should apply consistently across 
different social contexts, without regard to how those contexts might be characterized -
without regard, for example, to whether people's choices are viewed as voluntary or not, 
generated under conditions of autonomy or not, or reflect particular distributions of power; 
(7) That all relevant moral and political considerations must be fitted into the pre-estab-
lished cost-benefit formula (there can be no prior commitments to principles such as the 
government must always respect the lives of its citizens); 
(8) That ordinary people's values and understandings about what it is reasonable to do 
must be fitted into a utility formula treating risks and uncertainties as statistically expressed, 
discounted probabilities with a linear discount rate; 
(9) That whatever is a cost or benefit in one domain of public policy is equally a cost or 
benefit in some other domain, regardless of the kind of policymaking institution involved, 
the level of government, or other institutional considerations. 
By "cost-benefit analysis" or "traditional cost-benefit analysis" I mean any decisionmaking ap-
proach that accepts at least one of these understandings; as currently practiced, most cost-benefit 
analysis accepts many or even all of these tenets. See, e.g., E. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENE-
FIT-CoST ANALYSIS (2d ed. 1990); E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (4th ed. 1988). Cen-
tralizing cost-benefit analyses in a single entity that deals with widely different regulatory regimes 
virtually inherently strengthens commitments to many of these tenets. 
Most critiques of cost-benefit analysis focus on propositions l, 2, 3, and 4; the cultural criti-
cisms I develop here are principally directed at propositions 6, 7, 8, and secondarily at proposi-
tions 2 and 4. My target is the specific method of taking costs and benefits into account through 
tenets 1 to 9. 
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"soft" variables, such as better health, cleaner air, or higher quality 
life, that are difficult to assign a dollar value or precise quantitative 
"weight." Because these kinds of benefits are often more difficult to 
quantify than regulatory costs, they tend to get undervalued. In addi-
tion, to the extent such analyses proceed from imputed willingness-to-
pay figures, they are obviously sensitive to the preexisting distribution 
of wealth; forced to pay to avoid toxic chemical exposure, blue-collar 
workers will appear to value their health less than higher earning pro-
fessionals. But sophisticated public policy analysts now attempt, per-
haps with some success, to account for these and similar concerns. 
Once these more sophisticated analyses are completed - and 
health, or clean air, or the preservation of life, has implicitly been as-
signed some rough value that reflects what society seems prepared to 
spend or forgo to achieve it - the argument then becomes that policy 
ought to honor those values consistently.41 Yet when the costs and 
benefits of regulatory programs are examined, extreme variations in 
such imputed valuations emerge. Two manifestations of this "failing" 
have been noted. First, there are wide disparities in required risk-re-
duction investments across various hazards. For example, EPA regu-
lations of uranium mine tailing levels require industry to spend 
approximately $55 million for every life saved; OSHA regulations of 
ethylene oxide levels in the workplace require $1.l to $9 million per 
life saved; the 55 mile-per-hour speed limit imposed costs of only 
$59,000 for each life saved.42 Second, there are policy choices that 
seem irrationally to prefer certain technologies or regulatory strategies 
to others. Some public law writers, for example, note that generating 
electricity from coal-fired power plants is statistically likely to cause 
substantially more deaths, illnesses, and injuries than the same level of 
electricity generated through nuclear power.43 From this and similar 
41. See, e.g., MacLean, Introduction, in VALUES AT RlsK 1, 2 (D. MacLean ed. 1986) ("The 
estimated cost of saving a life should no doubt be brought more into line across different pro-
grams, not only for reasons of equity, but also for reasons of efficiency."). 
An application of this view is described in J. MAsHAW & D. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR 
AUTO SAFETY 216-17 (1990). In seeking to convince regulators to require that automobiles be 
equipped with pas5ive restraint systems, insurance companies offered a cost-benefit analysis in 
which the major benefits were lives saved and injuries avoided. To attempt to monetize these 
benefits so that they could be compared to costs, the companies assessed the imputed value per 
life saved of various regulatory programs, ranging from Medicare payments for dialysis treat-
ment to workplace safety regulations. From these figures (which varied by a factor of 10,000 -
from $93,000 to $989,000,000) the companies then computed an "average social value" for sav-
ing a human life of $520,000. They then argued that this was the figure that regulators should 
use to decide whether legally requiring passive restraint systems was cost-justified. 
42. These figures are in 1985 dollars and are taken from C. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 240-
41, which contains a table compiling figures for expenditures required per life saved for various 
regulations. Sunstein describes the results as "seemingly irrational." Id. at 241. 
43. See, e.g., Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Contro-
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data, those purportedly concerned with preserving human health and 
safety are said to act inconsistently in opposing nuclear power. In-
deed, many argue that such widely different values across different 
policy areas for human life and health, or the persistence of opposition 
to "new risks" that seem to pose greater hazards than old ones,44 ex-
poses the irrationality or technical ignorance of citizens and public 
policymakers. On this view, whatever the scope of political disagree-
ments, at least we always ought to prefer to save more lives rather 
than fewer; we similarly ought to value health and life reasonably con-
sistently in different contexts. 
Economists, public policy analysts, and public law scholars are 
continually frustrated by the failure of public policy to meet what they 
view as seemingly noncontroversial demands for consistency and ra-
tionality. To infuse such rationality into public policy, some public 
law scholars support increasingly centralized institutions designed to 
enhance the likelihood that government will apply cost-benefit analysis 
consistently across different regulatory domains. Professors Sunstein 
and Strauss, for example, endorse President Reagan's Executive Order 
requiring (except where barred by statute) cost-benefit review of all 
proposed agency regulations by one centralized entity, the Office of 
Management and Budget within the Executive Branch. 45 
These efforts to "rationalize" public policy, however, fundamen-
tally misconceive the values at stake in public decisions, as well as the 
role of democratic politics in determining those values. The general, if 
abstract reason, is that "costs" and "benefits" cannot be defined in a 
cultural vacuum.46 For example, what is valued as a benefit, what 
about it is valued, and how that value is to be realized depend upon 
cultural understandings and meanings. But cost-benefit analyses, even 
in their more sophisticated variants, cannot legitimately assign these 
understandings and meanings where they are controversial: only dem-
ocratic politics can. Indeed, the very structure of cost-benefit analysis 
versy, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1835 (1978) (using figures of 7 to 12 times the number of deaths 
from coal plants and 4 to 6 times as much sickness and injury); Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regu-
latory State, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 407, 418 (1990). 
The reliance of public law scholars on such analyses of this problem is ironic, because even 
public policy analysts generally disposed toward cost-benefit techniques have begun to view them 
as inappropriate for decisionmaking about generating electricity through nuclear power. See, 
e.g., Leonard & Zeckhauser, Cost-Benefit Analysis Applied to Risks: Its Philosophy and Legiti-
macy, in VALUES AT RISK, supra note 41, at 31, 42 ("Because of its associations with worldwide 
devastation, the question of whether to use nuclear power appears at this point, at least in many 
circles, to be beyond the realm of analysis of costs and benefits."). 
44. See, e.g., Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983). 
45. See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking. 38 
ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986). 
46. See supra note 40 for a more structured, specific set of descriptions of this failing. 
958 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:936 
runs roughshod over these understandings, for it requires that they be 
reduced to some single, common dimension before being aggregated, 
commensurated, and weighed against costs. These general points can 
be elaborated in three more specific ways. 
First, no objective value ("the" value of clean air, or a workplace 
free of a particular risk) inheres in any state of affairs. Things are 
valued as parts of social contexts; their value cannot be abstracted 
from these contexts. But the appropriate context and its meaning is a 
matter of clutural understandings, to be settled through collective 
choice. Thus, it makes little sense to ask how much we ought to spend 
or forgo in general to avoid "the risk" of exposure to a particular pol-
lutant, or toxic chemical, or type of injury. The same objective level of 
risk will have different meanings in distinct contexts. As people actu-
ally experience it, the nature and value of reducing any risk will vary 
with the setting in which it arises. 
For example, even if the marginal health/cost tradeoff is the same 
for equivalent reductions in particulates emitted by woodburning 
stoves and electric utility plants, people might not only value the 
harms differently, but resist regulation of the first while demanding it 
of the second. At stake in these choices, in part, is how much the 
activities of woodburning stoves and electric power production are 
valued in themselves (as well as how much other activities associated 
with them are valued). Generating heat through burning wood might 
be particularly valued socially, perhaps because it is associated with 
values such as self-reliance, or types of social relationships such as 
community-based rural life, that are viewed as distinctly worth re-
specting or preserving. If so, reducing emissions from such sources 
might simply be viewed differently than similar reductions from large-
scale utilities. These views are hardly "irrational,'' for beyond the cost 
and benefits of achieving "the same" level of risk reduction, the choice 
among these alternatives will construct different social landscapes. 
Such culturally constitutive dimensions of choice cannot be assessed 
through the incremental tools of cost-benefit analysis; political settings 
are required to socially define what is at stake and how those stakes 
ought to be understood and valued. 
Taking seriously people's own accounts of how they value various 
risks makes clear that social contexts are central to the actual experi-
ence of risk. Extensive interviews with a variety of workers, for exam-
ple, suggest that their valuations of workplace risks depend upon such 
matters as the nature of their jobs and the overall structure of work-
February 1991] Cultural Consequences of Public Policy 959 
place relations.47 When workers view themselves as pursuing highly 
valued callings and exercising significant control over the risks facing 
them, they interpret those risks differently. For example, the same 
objective level of exposure to certain chemicals is understood and val-
ued differently by research scientists, exposed during the course of car-
rying out basic research, than by laboratory assistants, who clean the 
hazards up after an experiment is complete. To the form.er, the risk's 
association with professional work that is highly valued socially, per-
sonally rewarding, voluntarily assumed, and connected to traditions of 
scientific inquiry might make eliminating that risk less pressing - par-
ticularly if the methods needed to do so (such as wearing certain 
equipment) would undermine valued aspects of a research career. 
From the external perspective of a policy analyst, the risk might seem 
the same, but from the inside, the risk involved has a different mean-
ing,· as a result, its reduction is valued differently. In general, inter-
views suggest that 
[w]orkers find the risks they encounter more acceptable the more their 
managers have established relations of trust with them, the more they 
exercise causal control over their risks, and the more voice they have in 
determining the circumstances of risk (the precautions to be taken, the 
assignment of responsibilities for safety, and so forth).48 
These are real values, real experiences, to which democratic decision-
making ought to be responsive; but the structure of cost-benefit analy-
sis, especially when applied through centralized, elite governmental 
institutions, tends to preclude taking them into account.49 
Second, because the values we associate with health, safety, or life 
depend on contexts, demanding "consistent" valuations in different 
contexts is itself irrational. When comparisons are made between the 
imputed value of saving lives associated with different types of regula-
tion, "the value" of safety and life is necessarily abstracted from differ-
ent contexts. But "the value" of safety or life simply has no meaning 
abstracted in this way. 
For example, social and legal norms require automobile manufac-
turers to spend substantial amounts of money to recall and repair de-
fectively designed vehicles, yet do not necessarily require spending the 
same amount of money to improve nondefectively designed ones -
47. See D. NELKIN & M. BROWN, WORKERS AT RISK (1984) (collecting interviews about 
workplace risks). The discussion in this paragraph draws directly from Anderson, Values, Risks, 
and Market Norms, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 54 (1988). 
48. Anderson, supra note 47, at 60 (citation omitted). 
49. Again, I am not saying a policymaking approach sensitive to costs and benefits cannot be 
responsive to such concerns, but that this kind of responsiveness requires abandoning traditional 
forms of expert cost-benefit assessment. See supra note 40. 
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even if the same objective risk reduction for drivers would result. A 
manufacturer's failure to enhance safety significantly through invest-
ing another $11 per ordinary car in precautionary equipment is not 
treated as irresponsible or illegal, but Ford's failure to spend that 
much to repair the defectively designed Pinto generated tort liability, 
criminal prosecution, and appropriate public outrage.50 Qualitative 
distinctions between these contexts, central to our social and moral 
experien9e but not capable of being captured in cost-benefit analyses, 
account for the difference. Through legal norms and public policies, 
we have defined and created a baseline of legitimate expectations re-
garding the risks associated with driving ordinary automobiles; more-
over, these baselines lead the resulting risks to be commonly viewed as 
voluntary. Against these baselines, omitting to take steps to make a 
car safer is not viewed as expressing contempt for human life. But a 
manufacturer that drops below this baseline through the undisclosed 
act of designing a defective car is perceived as acting reprehensibly, in 
part because the hidden defect negates the social characterization of 
the risk as voluntary. A cost-benefit calculus might justify similar 
safety expenditures, but the social meaning of refusing to make these 
expenditures in the two contexts differs radically. Human life is not 
being implicitly and irrationally assigned a different and grossly incon-
sistent value in these contexts; within our cultural understandings, the 
actions involved are viewed as qualitatively different in the most 
profound way - one respects human life and the other does not. 
For similar reasons, consistent imputed values for health and 
safety need not be an item on a New Public Law agenda. From a 
social and political perspective, reducing workplace hazards rather 
than those associated with driving might be more valued, because the 
contexts of risk imposition are experienced as morally different. The 
settings contrast in their distributions of risk; the latter involves a 
more egalitarian distribution, while the former involves risks highly 
concentrated on the group of workers exposed. In addition, concen-
trated risks might generally be disvalued more than widely shared 
ones. Alternatively, blue-collar workers might be viewed as lackipg 
sufficient options to treat them as having voluntarily assumed certain 
workplace risks, while we might characterize risks of driving as volun-
tarily assumed. These differences in moral and political judgment can 
rationally translate into different social valuations of the risks in-
volved. (Here the problem is not the method of cost-benefit analysis 
SO. For an extended discussion of this example in the context of the well known Ford Pinto 
controversy, see Pildes & Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value 
Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2150-51 (1990). 
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per se, but its extension by those who seek to "rationalize" public pol-
icy across different contexts.) 
Consider again the differences noted above in the apparent social 
valuation of life reflected in speed limit ($59,000) and certain work-
place safety regulation ($1.1 to $9 million). What point is cataloguing 
these sorts of comparisons supposed to make? That the most cost ef-
fective way of saving life would be continued reductions in speed lim-
its, rather than regulating exposure to toxic chemicals in the 
workplace? That we could save more lives at lower cost by eliminat-
ing automobiles? That we should eliminate workplace safety regula-
tion altogether and concentrate on automobiles? But pursuing these 
"more rational" strategies for risk reduction would, of course, have 
enormous consequences for both the way we live and the values that 
structure our lives. Reducing maximum speeds to 30 miles per hour 
would radically alter mobility, urban living patterns, work and social 
relationships, perceptions of freedom, and much more. 
Some of these consequences might readily be quantified along a 
single dimension, totalled, and compared, but many of the cultural 
and social considerations cannot be aggregated and evaluated this 
way. Deciding which changes are costs and which are benefits, as well 
as how to value and compare these changes, requires democratic 
choice. People can rationally choose to reject these social transforma-
tions, even while accepting more costly safety regulation that carries 
different social consequences and meaning. That is not to endorse the 
regulatory status quo, for particular existing regulations might well be 
the product of agency capture, information distortions, or other illegit-
imate factors. But to generally demand consistent health/cost trade-
offs in different contexts is to violate the right of democratic citizens to 
define the kirids of cultural contexts they value. 51 
A third way of describing the cultural insensitivity of even progres-
sive cost-benefit analyses is that they ignore the social meaning of tran-
sitions from one policy regime to another. Reflecting its origins in 
utilitarian thought and welfare economics, cost-benefit analyses in-
volve comparisons of total welfare52 between two static states: that 
51. See MacLean, Risk and Consent, in VALUES AT RISK, supra note 41, at 29 ("Perhaps the 
fear and opposition to certain large-scale projects has been misperceived because our attention 
has focused exclusively on safety risks. Perhaps the sources of the fear in some cases is about 
different kinds of risks to society, or the opposition may be to the way these decisions are being 
made."). For discussion of differences between expert and lay characterizations of risk, see Gil-
lette & Krier, Risks, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1070-86 (1990). 
52. This, of course, leaves to the side questions about the relationship of actual welfare to the 
surrogates for welfare used in cost-benefit analysis, which are typically monetized estimates of 
costs and benefits. 
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without the proposed governmental action and that with it. If total 
benefits would exceed costs from constructing a new dam to generate 
hydroelectric power (taking actual environmental costs fully into ac-
count), cost-benefit analysis suggests construction ought to occur. 
But the very act of publicly choosing to make this change can have 
significant expressive and cultural content. Under some circum-
stances, construction might widely be perceived to signal govern-
ment's abandonment of environmental values and to raise the specter 
that this reduced public commitment will shape future public and pri-
vate preferences on environmental and development conflicts. Per-
haps people's preferences will adapt to the changed status quo; 
perhaps people will become less willing to sacrifice for environmental 
ends when they no longer perceive themselves as members of commu-
nities making mutual sacrifices; perhaps, as Brandeis said, government 
is the great educator, of citizens and bureaucrats alike. Public deci-
sionmaking often implicates more than a quantum jump between two 
alternative end states: where the transition itself has social meaning, 
such as affirmation of new commitments, abandonment of prior obli-
gations, or recharacterization of public priorities, cost-benefit analysis 
cannot capture its significance. s3 
These cultural dimensions are often at stake in routine policy 
choices. 54 But suppose, for example, the choice arises during a time of 
particularly fevered conflict between environmentalists and develop-
ers. Then it might also be recognized as a symbolic (which means very 
53. These consequences, of course, might lead in many directions, including toward a popu· 
lar backlash against the government's apparent abandonment of prior public commitments; the 
result of the government's initial retreat might thus be even more fervent public environmental 
commitment. My point is only that, whatever the direction of these cultural and political conse· 
quences, cost-benefit analysis simply cannot take them into account. Nonetheless, they remain 
an important - perhaps central - dimension of many policy choices. 
Legal transitions frequently involve the sort of expressive dimensions briefly noted in the text. 
This is one of the reasons an economic analysis of public compensation policies for legal transi· 
tions fails to explain actual compensation practices. See Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509 (1986). As an extreme, but telling, example, after extensive 
political debate, compensation was not paid for the legal abolition of slavery (at least to members 
of the Confederacy), for the meaning of the Civil War and abolition made compensation a mor· 
ally "discredited" idea. See E. FONER, supra note 17, at 74. For a fuller analysis of the expres· 
sive dimensions of the choice to compensate and the forms compensation might take, see R. 
Pildes, Law's Meaning: A Non-Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions (unpublished 
manuscript). 
54. Yale Kamisar, for example, has pointed out that contemporary debate over whether Mi· 
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), ought to be overruled assumes that question to be identi· 
cal to whether Miranda ought to have been decided as it was in the first place. But as Kamisar 
argues, overruling Miranda today would not merely restore a status quo ante; given the cultural 
role of Miranda since its inception, its demise would likely have widely perceived implications for 
police and public understandings regarding legitimate police practices more generally. See 
Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 
MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 584-89 (1990). 
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real55) test of the political power and support of the competing inter-
ests - not just as interests, but as representatives of conflicting values. 
Both might seek to use the conflict to enlist further supporters and 
financial contributions; more interestingly, both advocate distinct 
ways of characterizing public choices, of resolving conflicts in values, 
and of defining the appropriate aims of social choice. The outcome 
might well affect the future distribution of political power between the 
clashing groups. That is, specific political choices today are partly 
about the distribution of political power tomorrow: politics itself re-
distributes political power. 
Logrolling and vote-trading, of course, have such effects, but these 
effects are more immediate, concrete, narrowly focused, and limited in 
scope and time than the ones I mean to emphasize. Political outcomes 
can more profoundly change the distribution of power for future polit-
ical conflict by endowing today's victors with greater resources of sev-
eral types for future struggles. The enhanced resources might be 
material: the byproducts of public policies and legal decisions, at 
times intended and at times not, are often redistributions of economic 
power. Sometimes these redistributions are immediately visible at 
macroscopic levels; sometimes they can be seen only microscopically, 
but the cumulation of such changes is still significant. Or the en-
hanced resources might be political: internally, success can enhance 
the credibility of a political group and the commitment of its mem-
bers; externally, success can forge more enduring relations with politi-
cally influential public officials. Most important for my purposes here, 
the enhanced future resources flowing from today's political successes 
are often cultural: current decisions can structure the ways certain 
problems will be characterized in the future, the definition of what 
constitutes a problem at all, or the appropriate processes for resolving 
similar conflicts of value. Public choice today can crystallize social 
understandings in ways that structure the perceived context, meaning, 
and appropriate outcomes of choices to be made tomorrow.56 
55. My concern with the cultural dimensions of policy should be distinguished from 
Eclelman's concept of"symbolic politics." See M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF PoLmcs 
7 (1964) ("Practically every political act that is controversial ... is bound to serve in part as a 
condensation symbol. It evokes a quiescent or an aroused mass response because it symbolizes a 
threat or reassurance."). Eclelman emphasizes the mass affective or psychological response to 
public choices and generally views "symbolic" political action as that which has little substan-
tive, material effect but powerful emotional resonance. See also H. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOL-
OGY AND PoLmcs (1930). My focus is not solely the expressive dimensions of public policies, 
but the cultural consequences policies produce; on the ways day-to-day experience of these conse-
quences after policies are adopted affects the policies themselves as well as social relationships; on 
the relationship between technocratic and democratic conceptions of value; and on the ex ante 
design of policy and policymaking institutions in ways that incorporate these concerns. 
56. Closure, of course, is never achieved, which is why in both politics and law precedent is 
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Thus, the dynamic construction of norms as well as complex distri-
butions of power are at stake in discrete policy choices. But to the 
cost-benefit analyst, whether a dam should be built has nothing to do 
with these considerations or the contingent political circumstances 
present at the time the choice is confronted. If more total social wel-
fare will be found "in" State B than in State A, State B should be 
chosen. Seen in this light, even the most progressive cost-benefit anal-
yses appear as a technocratic damper on the ongoing political and 
value struggles characteristic of vibrant democracies. 
If these concerns are telling, they carry institutional implications. 
They suggest that efforts of some progressive public law scholars to 
ensure consistent cost-benefit assessments through more centralized 
decisionmaking are not only misconceived, but dangerous. 57 "Ratio-
nalizing" policy within and across different regulatory domains by 
making it even more responsive to the calculations of "experts" will 
only further collapse morally and politically relevant understandings 
into single-dimensional calculations; as a result, those understandings 
will be undermined and policy further distanced from the concerns of 
those affected. Instead, we need to find institutional frameworks that 
permit those affected to debate and define their own characterizations 
of the values at stake, their own valuations of those values, and the 
social and political meaning of the actions contemplated. 
At this stage, I can only suggest in general terms the form such 
structures might take. Most important, they should be decentralized 
enough to facilitate more direct participation and voice for those 
whom policy will affect. This conceptual search should aim to create 
institutional understandings through which decisionmaking officials 
will recognize that policy expresses and therefore should partially re-
flect social understandings and cultural norms; that values are defined 
through these understandings and norms; that ordinary ethical experi-
at best momentarily stable. The important point is that present choices redistribute the capacity 
to influence future ones. To political actors this will hardly sound surprising, but it might par-
tially explain the widespread resistance to cost-benefit techniques. That past choices influence 
the culture of future choices is not to be lamented, for democratic politics is continual redefini-
tion of the values, understandings, and aims that constitute a particular society; democracy is 
about the development of ends, not merely the means to realize predefined ends, and this ongoing 
process typically works from within the understandings and values embodied in prior decisions. 
The extent to which "a society" is self-conscious of this aspect of democratic politics likely re-
flects the degree of social conflict or consensus perceived among its relevant groups, but the 
process takes place nonetheless. 
57. As an extreme example of progressive new public law scholars pursuing strategies of 
"rationalizing" public policy through use of cost-benefit techniques, see Christopher E<lley's cas-
ual suggestion that courts might require agencies "to evaluate regulatory alternatives using cost· 
benefit analysis." c. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 231 (1990). For a critique ofEdley's sug-
gestion which recognizes the dimensions of public choice obscured in cost-benefit techniques, see 
Sargentich, The Future of Administrative Law, 104 HARV. L. REv. 769, 785 (1991). 
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ence is therefore central to determining the costs and benefits of pol-
icy; and that policy should respect meaningful differences between 
social contexts. 5s 
Lest these only briefly developed criticisms be misunderstood, I do 
not mean that sophisticated cost-benefit assessments have no appropri-
ate role. Such calculations can help give more determinate content to 
some dimensions of the tradeoffs at stake in policy choices. Perhaps 
for some projects whose consequences are widely viewed as only in-
strumental, these assessments will incorporate all the relevant values 
and concerns. More generally, cost-benefit assessments provide one 
perspective on necessary tradeoffs, but they should be recognized as 
merely that: one of many, potentially competing, perspectives for 
democratic decisionmaking to address. In particular settings, cost-
benefit proponents might convince others to accept their implicit char-
acterizations of value. But only public debate and decision, rather 
than coercive appeals to the objectivity of cost-benefit assessments, 
should be permitted to determine the appropriate role of these tech-
niques in specific contexts. 
Many questions remain about how more participatory approaches 
to public policy might be channeled and structured. 59 I neither offer a 
comprehensive normative framework meant to close off further debate 
nor trust efforts to do so. My aspirations are more limited (hence, I 
would claim, more useful) and more pragmatic than that. As cur-
rently institutionalized, understood, and applied, cost-benefit ap-
proaches tend to impose expert assessments of "objective value" on 
the legitimate social experience of values. Hence policymaking in-
creasingly seems in the hands of a narrow few; substantive policies 
often seem at war with the understandings and values of those af-
fected. Demanding consistent implicit valuations of health and safety 
58. For a proposal to this effect, see J. CAMPEN, BENEFIT, CoST, AND BEYOND 191-212 
(1986). Some cost-benefit proponents recognize the value of more participatory policymaking 
settings likely to generate decisions at odds with those dictated by traditional cost-benefit tech-
niques. See Leonard & Zeckhauser, supra note 43, at 43 ("[I]t is not obvious that the [cost-
benefit] mechanism is in fact better operated by 'technocrats.' We are not sure why centralized 
assessments, whether by technicians, bureaucrats, or consultants, should be presumed to be bet-
ter than those of members of the community at large."). Although Leonard and Zeckhauser 
endorse more decentralized cost-benefit assessment processes, this essay offers a quite different 
understanding and justification for why those affected by policy ought to be more directly in-
volved in its development. The transaction and administrative costs of more participatory forms 
of decisionmaking are well known and necessary to consider but cannot be addressed here. In 
addition, certain public risks pose special challenges for democratic institutional design; first, 
their effects may be irreversible yet latent for many years, calling into question the incremental 
and trial-and-error strategies characteristically associated with democratic decision, and second, 
the geographic scope of certain public risks does not neatly fit existing political jurisdictions. See 
Gillette & Krier, supra note 51, at 1105-09. 
59. I address one such question infra at text accompanying notes 80-81. 
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in different contexts, for example, erodes what are experienced as im-
portant moral differences between those contexts. 
Given current policymaking practice and advocacy, the need is to 
begin to have the actual, diverse experiences of value in discrete con-
texts taken more seriously. Undermining the familiar technocratic 
view that value is objective seems a useful place to start. Whether the 
theory of cost-benefit analysis might be reconceived to accommodate 
my concerns is too complex to address. 60 The fact is, current practices 
do not. It is to those practices that my current arguments respond. 
Once policymaking begins to take the actual experience of values more 
seriously, there will be time enough to refine and qualify as more sub-
tle concerns emerge. That is a claim about the relation of theory to 
practice: we need not survey all the topography ahead to begin mov-
ing in the right direction. 
III. THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF POLICY III: THE SOCIAL 
DEGRADATION OF WORK THROUGH PROGRESSIVE 
LEGAL CHANGE 
The structure of public programs not only shapes their general so-
cial meaning. Legal norms and public policies also condition the local 
experience of work itself, both for those in public programs and for 
private workers whose environment is increasingly determined by 
changes in the legal background. So, too, the interactions between 
public administrators and the clients with whom they deal are struc-
tured through legal norms. In some general sense, law today is exper-
ienced as more pervasive, more demanding, more imbricated in the 
day-to-day contexts of work for more people. 61 This increasing reach 
of law has often been prompted by genuine failures in public and pri-
vate institutions: lack of accountability, refusals to honor rights, ineffi-
ciencies, inequalities in treatment, rampant subjectivity, inconsistent 
actions,_ and the like. Nonetheless, we are increasingly recognizing 
60. In significant part, the answer depends on how "cost-benefit" theory is defined. If de-
fined as it is in almost all contemporary policy-science approaches, the answer is no. See supra 
note 40. 
61. In a theoretical sense, of course, law has always structured public and private work set-
tings. Even Legal Realists, who had little sense of the culturally constitutive role of law, recog-
nized as a logical matter that law necessarily defines the entitlements and contours within which 
social and economic interaction take place. See, e.g., Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 COR· 
NELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 
(1943). In this conceptual sense, there can never be "more" or "less" law in any environment, 
public or private, because the failure to exercise the potentiality of law is itself an aspect of law. I 
am speaking instead of the actual experience, the felt sense, of the reach of law. Changes in 
common law doctrine from negligence to strict liability that impose more stringent obligations on 
defendants, for example, do not conceptually increase the "net amount" of law, but seem likely 
to be experienced as doing so. 
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that unintended, but troubling, cultural consequences can ensue from 
legal strategies for dealing with these failures. 
In legal scholarship, this story has been told with the most detail 
and sophisticated sensibility in William Simon's work on the transfor-
mation since the 1960s of the welfare system. 62 During the 1960s, lib-
eral reformers became concerned with the discretionary powers that 
welfare caseworkers exercised. Caseworkers used these powers to cre-
ate relations of personal dependency, to impose their own conceptions 
of morality on benefit recipients, and to deny benefits on racist 
grounds. Some of these concerns could be traced to the substantive 
norms of statutory law then prevailing; others were viewed as agency 
costs facilitated by the administrative discretion for line-level 
caseworkers built into the system. During the 1970s, conservatives 
became increasingly vocal about other perceived problems, including 
inefficiencies and waste in the system. 
The confluence of these demands led to the legal restructuring of 
welfare administration. As Simon emphasizes, these restructurings 
not only were codified through law, but reflected a general, widely 
shared63 vision oflegality and administrative organization. This vision 
embraced and sought to institutionalize the values of formality, equal-
ity, consistency, and privacy. 
To reduce discretionary decisionmaking, the substantive eligibility 
standards were formalized as entitlements in more rule-like, categori-
cal terms, with more tightly specified, objective triggering criteria de-
termining eligibility. To reduce oppressive moralizing as well as gain 
tighter control over benefit payouts, tasks were specialized and labor 
divided; counseling and financial assistance roles were parceled out so 
that caseworkers would occupy only the latter. To control waste, pro-
ductivity standards were developed and enforced. To enhance equal-
ity, consistency, and efficiency, an elaborate quality control system, 
based on business management techniques, was imposed. With the use 
of statistical methods, fiscal sanctions, and extensive oversight by 
higher levels in an increasingly stratified administrative structure, 
caseworker decisions were more aggressively supervised. 
In sum, Simon describes an increasingly Weberian bureaucracy -
one characterized by a rigidly hierarchical organizational structure 
and driven by aspirations to legal rationality and formality. Whatever 
the benefits of these changes, they also transformed the experience of 
62. See Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 
(1983). 
63. At least among lawyers, including lawyers and legal reformers with quite different polit-
ical orientations. 
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both caseworkers and program beneficiaries. Some of these specific 
changes were intended, but the broader transformations were not. 
The relationship of caseworker to client changed from a personal 
one involving professional judgment and, in good circumstances, some 
degree of care, counseling, and trust, to a more impersonal stance. Be-
cause the performance of caseworkers was measured against general 
standards whose application in individual cases was interpreted by ad-
ministrative supervisors, the incentives of caseworkers and hence their 
understanding of their roles came to be defined in terms of general, 
overarching, programmatic goals rather than in terms of individual-
ized client needs. While professionally trained social workers had pre-
viously sought and filled caseworker positions, caseworkers came to be 
"socialized to think of the role as characterized by routine, unreflec-
tive judgment and responsibility only to hierarchical organizational 
authority" - in the words of one observer, "bank tellers" replaced 
social workers. 64 
As experienced by claimants, the system became less able to take 
into, account their individual circumstances, more mysterious, and 
more Kafkaesque. 65 Division and specialization of labor meant that 
claimants lost the continuity of personal connections and began to be 
shunted from one office to another. Objectifying entitlement condi-
tions led to extensive, often senseless documentation requirements re-
placing more informal modes of presenting evidence. Because 
caseworkers were explicitly taught and implicitly moved to redefine 
their role away from purposeful interpretation of norms in individual 
cases, for claimants "the system" became a system: uninterested in 
their particular needs, individuality, and circumstances. 
These changes, it must be emphasized, might have been byprod-
ucts of genuine improvements in the administration of welfare. Such 
costs might have been worth the gains. 66 But they might not be, and 
at the least we ought to recognize the reconstructed system as a sec-
ond-best rather than some costless ideal of legality (leaving aside, as 
this discussion does, debate over substantive welfare policy). More 
generally, Simon's microscopic history of welfare reform offers two 
general cautionary tales that New Public Law scholarship might 
pursue. 
First, traditional legal values such as consistency, generality, objec-
64. Simon, supra note 62, at 1216 (quoting the Director of Labor Relations of the Massachu· 
setts Welfare Department). 
65. Id. at 1199. 
66. Simon argues that in fact these reforms did little to realize their stated goals, but I find 
his analysis on this point less developed and, partly for that reason, less persuasive. 
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tivity, or equality are not the only values at stake in public programs. 
At times, single-minded pursuit of these values erodes others. This 
has increasingly come to be recognized in the regulatory field, 67 but it 
applies to public benefit programs and elsewhere. Indeed, the problem 
is as much cultural as legal, for efforts outside public law to "rational-
ize" various institutions and practices to ensure consistent compliance 
with highly general and objective norms are increasingly common. In 
many areas, the nonquantifiable consequences of these reforms are 
bleak. 68 Legal reformers, in particular, need to become attuned to the 
danger of myopic professional arrogance about the dominance of 
traditional legal values; policymakers and legal advocates often work 
at the most rarified levels of public programs, rarely forced to confront 
the ground level cultural reverberations of their triumphs. 69 
Second, the rules/standards debate in law over the appropriate 
form of legal norms needs to be enriched to include the sociological, 
psychological, and dynamic consequences of these choices in different 
contexts. Much of the scholarship in this area focuses on epistemolog-
ical questions about the possibility that norms can be expressed in 
rule-like form. Other work focuses on the relative efficiency of rules 
and standards. Still other work asks whether rules or standards "bet-
ter" comport with abstract concerns of institutional role and compe-
tence. These types of inquiries, however, ignore what seems the most 
significant dimension of the choice for the actual implementation of 
public programs: how the form in which public norms are expressed 
shapes the understandings and experiences of those carrying out as 
well as those touched by public programs, and hence ultimately colors 
the general experience and success of policy itself. 
67. See E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK 3-119 (1982) (describing detrimen-
tal consequences from the formalization of OSHA inspection policies, which required line·level 
inspectors to "go by the book" in implementing regulatory norms); Stewart, supra note 38. 
68. For one such account in a surprising field, consider the transformations in professional 
basketball officiating described by Earl Strom, recently retired and highly respected in his profes-
sional role. According to Strom's account, recent efforts to ensure "consistency" of decisions 
among referees, including requiring that the rules of the game be applied in the most aeon textual, 
objective, categorical ways and that superiors extensively review decisions to ensure that the rules 
are being applied this way, have not only eroded the sense of professionalism among referees, but 
subtly eroded the quality of the sport itself. Strom & Johnson, How to Call 'Em Like a Pro, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 5, 1990, at 124. 
69. For example, Richard Pierce advocates that courts cede to centralized political actors 
greater discretion to impose on Administrative Law Judges techniques of "management science 
and quality control" which seek to enhance the consistency and productivity of their decisions. 
Pierce, Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from 
Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 481, 501-15 (1990). Whatever the merits of such 
proposals, their failure to address the sorts of nontechnocratic, cultural concerns raised by Si-
mon's careful case study suggests current public law scholars have yet to absorb such perspec-
tives on policy. 
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One unexplored area to which public law scholars might apply 
these perspectives is the recent legal and regulatory transformation of 
American medicine.70 Law, policy, and economic forces are radically 
restructuring that profession - in ways and with consequences that 
resonate with Simon's depiction of welfare administration. Yet legal 
scholarship has not begun to address the role of law in reshaping the 
cultural matrix within which medical care is provided. Perhaps public 
law academics view doctors as privileged elites, or these changes as 
merely working desirable economic redistributions, or nationalized 
health care as the only debate worth engaging in this area. But signifi-
cant social consequences loom, manifested in part by the remarkable 
twenty-nine percent decline in medical school applications between 
1974 and 1988-a decline anecdotally attributed to the changing con-
text of care, with current doctors and others reportedly having tried to 
dissuade eighty percent of even those who nonetheless decided to 
enroll.71 
Briefly put, the major changes include the law of malpractice and, 
more important, the culture of malpractice law;72 increasingly aggres-
sive oversight of the exercise of professional judgment by large institu-
tions, including the government and private insurers; and the more 
general emerging influence and control of the field by large, often dis-
tant and hierarchically structured corporate entities. 73 The legal 
70. The "public law" label is particularly obscuring here, for public institutions, of course, 
are involved in restructuring the private practice of medicine. Empty public/private distinctions 
aside, the area remains one worthy of serious legal attention. 
71. Johnson, The Gates to Medical School Open Wider as Fewer Knock, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 
1988, at 1, col. 1; see also Libov, The Medical Profession Has Changed, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 
1988, § 12CN, at 3, col. 1. 
72. This story is too complex to tell here, but changes in the substantive legal norms gov-
erning medical practice are not as significant as is often assumed. Of such changes, the most 
important seem to be those making the duty of care less a "local community" standard (thus not 
only imposing more stringent standards of liability but enhancing the pool of doctors available as 
witnesses for plaintiffs), some slight changes in the application of res ipsa loquiter, and more 
aggressive interpretations of informed consent requirements. The most significant practical effect 
of the latter seems not to be in legal outcomes, since these cases reportedly only rarely result in 
plaintiffs' victories, but in the nature of the doctor-patient interaction and in testing, documenta-
tion, and consultation practices. 
More important changes might be described as cultural, such as the willingness of doctors to 
testify against each other and the erosion among patients of norms of deference to professional 
expertise and authority. I also suspect (though this would be difficult to document) that changes 
in the underlying understanding of the goals and justifications for tort law, reflected in the gen-
eral emergence of products liability law and the rebirth of strict liability, affect judicial attitudes 
even in negligence cases - as in medical malpractice - on issues such as directed verdicts, 
judgments notwithstanding the verdict, and the like. 
73. Evidence of the development of these practices - and emerging legal responses to them 
- is chronicled in Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 
(1990). There a treating physician concluded that a patient suffering from major depression, 
drug dependency, and anorexia needed three to four weeks of in-patient care. After 10 days, the 
patient's insurance company determined that further hospitalization was "not justified." Be-
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dimensions of these changes reflect progressive goals, such as making 
doctors more accountable, responding to market failrires from third-
party insurance schemes, and generally assuring that public and pri-
vate funds are well spent. But pursuit of these progressive aims has 
generated unintended cultural consequences, many of them similar to 
those in welfare administration. 
The doctor-patient relationship has reportedly become less per-
sonal and more adversarial. Government insurance programs are 
structured through categorical, rule-like coverage limitations, leaving 
little room for the exercise of professional judgments in individual 
cases; for example, certain procedures not generally viewed as medi-
cally necessary will not be reimbursed even when doctors view them as 
medically appropriate in specific, unusual contexts. Efforts to avoid 
unnecessary expenses have led to demands. for consistency in treat-
ments and costs across patients. To enforce these demands, a form of 
"quality control" has emerged, known as "utilization review," which 
requires doctors to justify their treatment and hospitalization decisions 
to members of public and private bureaucracies who face their own 
organizational incentives. 74 In turn, to meet these demands doctors 
now devote considerable resources to consulting with each other, ex-
tensively documenting their actions, and justifying their exercise of 
professional judgment to others. 75 Declining interest in careers as 
doctors, disaffection among those already practicing, and increasing 
dissatisfaction among patients and doctors with their relationships ap-
pear among the results. 76 
As in the welfare area, I cannot assess whether the changes in the 
cause the patient had no other insurance coverage, he was discharged; 20 days later he commit-
ted suicide. The court reversed summary judgment for the defendant and held that an insurance 
company can be liable in tort if it negligently overrides a treating physician's professional judg-
ment, and if that negligence is a substantial factor in causing injury. 
74. See, e.g., Insurers vs. Doctors: Who Knows Best?, Bus. WK., Feb. 18, 1991, at 64-65 
(describing corporate efforts to make medical decisions more "scientific," including the emer-
gence of "review companies" that compile data on treatment strategies in different regions and 
hospitals and then assist insurers in enforcing demands for nationally uniform, consistent treat-
ment decisions). 
75. Because there has been little legal writing on these issues to date, the information in this 
paragraph rests in significant part on private conversations and anecdotal evidence. For some 
published confirmation, see Cohen, Wade & Woodward, Medical-Legal Concerns among Cana-
dian Anaesthetists, 37 CANADIAN J. ANAESTHESIA 102 (1990); see also Johnson, supra note 72. 
According to one New York Times article, patients report increasing problems with doctors. 
"The doctor has an uncaring attitude. He's gruff. He's brusque. He's arrogant. He doesn't 
listen." The changes described in text are cited as offering some explanation for these apparent 
changes. Libov, supra note 72. 
76. At this stage, I only mean to raise concerns for legal scholars about the possible cultural 
consequences of changes in the background conditions of medicine; I cannot establish that the 
claimed causal connections do exist. Certainly doctors' incomes are also affected by these 
changes, but I am not concerned with that shift or its effects. 
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ways doctors experience their profession or patients and doctors expe-
rience their mutual relationship justify the benefits associated with the 
regulatory and legal sides of the transformation of medicine. I am 
convinced, however, that we need more work examining the personal 
and social implications of legal change in different contexts. But as a 
general agenda, public law scholars might begin to focus on the cul-
tural costs wrought through imposition of the universal and abstract 
legal values of formality, consistency, equality, efficiency, and the in-
stitutional forms - bureaucratic, hierarchically structured, rule-en-
forcing primary or supervisory organizations - this dominant vision 
of legality tends to reflect and generate. 
IV. TECHNOCRACY, DEMOCRACY, AND ANTICIPATED CONCERNS 
The ideas offered here are meant to be speculative and suggestive, 
rather than fully developed and justified. In general, I am skeptical of 
the search for comprehensive normative frameworks to guide public 
policy, frameworks designed in advance of specific problems to dis-
solve all potential ambiguities or settle all doubts. Public policy issues 
seem too contextual, too refractory to yield to such frameworks; at 
most, I believe, public law scholarship can pragmatically strive to reo-
rient policy debate toward values and perspectives inappropriately ne-
glected under current circumstances. Even so, certain likely 
challenges can be anticipated. Perhaps a few initial words in response 
will help clarify the theory and justifications underlying the specific 
proposals in this essay. 
A. Isn't It Dangerous To Advocate Replacing "Objective Value" 
with Actual, Diverse, Individual Experiences of Value? 
I have argued against the view that any objective value can be as-
signed to particular policy outcomes. Instead, "the value" associated 
with any state of affairs depends on how that state is experienced, 
characterized, historicized, and interpreted by those affected. From 
that theory of value, I have moved to embracing more democratic in-
stitutional structures than those relying on policymaking expertise. 
But extolling the "subjective experience of value" might lead to 
concern that policy will be held hostage to the unmediated private 
preferences of individuals. Cognitive psychologists, economists, and 
social philosophers have chronicled numerous ways in which the legit-
imacy of relying on these preferences might be questioned: they might 
reflect the particular history and conditions under which they were 
formed, limitations on information or information-processing capac-
ity, cognitive biases and the like. In this sense, private preferences 
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might be "irrational" or "distorted." Moreover, the legitimacy and 
justice of democratic choice in general is complex, given concerns for 
minority interests and the preservation of certain substantive values 
associated with individual dignity and self-development; for example, 
direct democracy, in the form of voter initiatives and referenda, has 
been challenged on just these grounds. 77 Don't these limitations to 
democracy pose substantial difficulties for the proposals in this essay? 
These kinds of objections do not seem to challenge the epistemo-
logical foundations of my claim as much as its prudence. That is, even 
accepting that value cannot be objective, perhaps institutions should 
be designed as if it is; the resulting policies might likely be "better" 
than those from other means of public choice. 
Two partial responses, however, can be quickly noted. First, the 
characteristic concerns of democratic theocy for minority interests and 
individual rights remain ones for all democratic institutions: represen-
tative ones, directly democratic ones, or elite ones ultimately subject to 
democratic control. Institutional checks and substantive guarantees 
have been devised to attempt to deal with these concerns in some con-
texts; no a priori reason suggests they could not be similarly designed 
for a more participatory public policy. 
Second, challenges to the potential "irrationality" and "distortion" 
of individual preferences potentially extend to expert valuations as 
well.78 Nothing yet suggests experts are more immune than others to 
such potential distortions as adaptive preferences, counter-adaptive 
preferences, and the like. Thus, noting potential defects in preference 
formation in general is not in itself an argument for any particular 
means of public choice. Moreover, the kind of preference that should 
be viewed as "irrational" or "distorted" is part of what I mean to call 
into question; merely because an outside "expert" would declare a 
view irrational does not make it so. For example, in marginal cost-
benefit terms it might not be rational to reduce a risk below a certain 
level, given the "objective" remaining risk to health. But if the result-
77. See, e.g., Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. 
R.Ev. 1 (1978). But see B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 282-83 (1984) ("While Madisonian 
theorists have stood trembling at the prospects of a leviathan public running amok in school-
rooms filled with voting machines, students of the referendum's practical effects have been offer-
ing more soothing pictures."). Barber's study, of course, predates more recent and perhaps more 
troubling experience with referenda in states like California. 
78. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 51, at 1093-99 (summarizing studies showing distortions 
in expert assessments of risks). In addition, even "undistorted" expert evaluations of risk rest on 
certain conceptions of rationality apparently not widely shared; privileging these expert concep-
tions of rationality (over ones more generally relied upon in ordinary decisionmaking) requires 
independent justification. See Noll & Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk 
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 778 n.42 (1990). 
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ing level of risk still generates considerable anxiety and fear, that ac-
tual experience and perception might nonetheless justify further 
reductions. Diminishing anxiety and fear are not necessarily irrational 
aims of public policy - whether those fears themselves are "ration-
ally" grounded or not. That is not to say such fears necessarily should 
be relevant to public decisions, for relevance cannot be assessed ab-
stractly but only in the context of specific choices. At the least, 
though, actual experiences like these should not be dismissed in 
advance. 
More generally, expanded participation in policy tradeoffs can still 
be institutionally channeled and structured. Just as the Constitution 
was designed to facilitate deliberative decisionmaking at the level of 
representative political institutions, for example, structures for more 
democratic public choice ought to encourage deliberation as well. Ex-
periences of value depend 'on how the setting of choice is character-
ized: its history, meaning, and significance. Those characterizations 
should be part of public debate, rather than precluded by characteriza-
tions implicit in the perspectives of experts, but debate is still required 
to decide which characterizations to accept. The illusory spectra of 
policy dominated by unmediated, unjustified, rampant subjectivity of 
experience and value need not validate decisionmaking by trained 
elites. 
B. Isn't There a Fundamental Inconsistency Between the 
Justifications for My Different Critiques and Proposals? 
Arguing against the possibility of objective assessments of value in 
Part II might seem to undermine the critiques of specific public poli-
cies developed in Parts I and III. If public values cannot be objec-
tively assessed, where is the critical leverage for the reforms I suggest; 
in what sense can they be justified? Doesn't accepting the arguments 
in Part II erode the possibility of objective, critical standards against 
which public policy can be evaluated? A similar challenge can be put 
from another direction. Emphasizing the relevance of ordinary under-
standings to public decisions suggests that policy should reflect ex-
isting perspectives; yet several proposals in this essay seem to override 
the values already expressed in current public programs. To tum my 
own language against me, perhaps many people today are "con-
tractarians" who value living in a political culture that permits them 
to buy in and out of public programs. Doesn't abandoning commit-
ment to objective conceptions of value erode the legitimacy of chal-
lenging those preferences? 
Two conceptions of objectivity must be distinguished to disentan-
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gle these concerns. Values might be objective if they could be derived 
through demonstrative, logical proof that begins from uncontroversial 
axioms or unmediated sensory experience. Rejecting this traditional 
foundationalist view need not, however, entail lapsing into a wholly 
relativistic stance in which values are seen as nothing more than 
purely subjective, unjustified and unjustifiable private tastes. Instead, 
we can conceive a middle course between these poles, one that might 
be described either as transcending the traditional objectivity/subjec-
tivity dichotomy or, instead, as offering an alternative conception of 
objectivity.79 In this alternative, the only meaningful sense in which 
values can be objective is that they are embraced, affirmed, and 
respected within the understandings, practices, norms, and institutions 
of a particular political community. That is, criteria remain available 
for evaluating public policies or legal norms, but these criteria are in-
ternal to our own political culture: to other widely accepted public 
programs, to traditional understandings still affirmed today, and the 
like. 
I mean to reject the first" conception of objectivity and endorse the 
second. Cost-benefit theory also purports to reject the first conception, 
yet interestingly turns out implicitly to depend on it. The theory, of-
fered as a pragmatic, hardheaded, anti-ideological approach to poli-
cymaking, seems to abandon "objective" theories of value in making 
costs and benefits rest on subjective, contingent valuations, such as 
willingness to pay (explicit or imputed). But as I have tried to show, 
the technique necessarily requires that the complex characterizations 
implicated in public decisions - the values perceived to be at stake, 
the contextual meaning of the decision against the history that condi-
tions it - be aggregated along a single dimension and then commen-
surated with each other. At its core, then, cost-benefit theory is 
committed to the view that the apparent diversity of public values can 
be reduced and redescribed in this single dimensional way. To justify 
this commitment, cost-benefit theory must assume there is a right way 
to characterize the context of public choice and to fold apparently di-
verse considerations into a single dimension; belief that these are un-
controversial assumptions sustains cost-benefit techniques. In this 
sense, then, faith in the possibility of objective characterizations of 
choices and objective means of aggregating and commensurating val-
ues is central to cost-benefit approaches. 
79. The attempt to develop such alternatives links the various "reconciliatory projects" in 
contemporary intellectual thought that Frank Michelman chronicles in Michelman, The 
Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 31-
36 (1986), discussed in Eskridge & Peller, supra note 1, at 758-761. 
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If these views were widely shared and validated in publicly ac-
cepted norms and practices, they would be objective in the sense I find 
meaningful. But the kinds of characterizations and techniques in cost-
benefit methods in fact embody a complex set of moral, cultural, and 
political judgments that are deeply controversial and far from 
shared. so Indeed, much to the frustration of policy analysts, cost-ben-
efit approaches are consistently viewed as wreaking havoc with ordi-
nary understandings and public aims; Congress continues to reject 
them in most regulatory contexts. In every setting, then, such ap-
proaches need to be justified and democratically approved as the basis 
for choice, rather than being coercively imposed in the name of 
rationality. 
The second, internal conception of objectivity not only informs the 
critique of cost-benefit analysis in Part II, but the constructive policy 
agenda in Parts I and III. My suggestions draw on understandings 
embedded in past public decisions and appeal to values and concerns 
widely affirmed but often ignored in policy. By looking to the history 
of military-service plans to formulate challenges to current mandatory 
pro bono proposals, for example, I mean to confirm that structures of 
public programs have an expressive meaning and that choices more 
consistent with general cultural values can generate more support for 
programs, more satisfaction with serving in them, and more effective 
delivery of goods. The justification for such choices, then, is neither 
some general, external set of objective criteria nor a static appeal to 
what people today - before legitimate experience of these programs 
- would endorse. 
I believe my proposed reorientation of public law thinking draws 
on values broadly shared if underappreciated in scholarly and poli-
cymaking circles. Even so, further, more difficult epistemological 
challenges remain. For example, current contractualized structures 
do find significant support. Similarly, while I believe many would ac-
cept my critique of cost-benefit techniques, those techniques are also 
widely advocated. In conceiving objectivity as I do and in appealing 
not just to existing values but to those that different policy choices 
might bring about, I recognize that values are in flux. At base, then, 
the demand that my proposals be "consistent" is a demand that I pro-
vide a general, theoretical answer as to which preferences or values 
80. Indeed, I have argued at length that the ways in which many public values are actually 
understood and experienced in our culture does preclude their being able to be aggregated and 
commensurated in the way cost-benefit analyses, or economic analyses more generally, require. 
See Pildes & Anderson, supra note 50, at 2145-66. 
February 1991] Cultural Consequences of Public Policy 977 
policy ought to follow, when the values at stake are dynamic and per-
haps adaptive to the choices we are trying to make. 
In my view, that poses the most significant philosophical problem 
of our time: how can collective decisions be justified in the absence of 
external standards for justification and with the knowledge that cur-
rent values can be endogenous to the very decisions we are seeking to 
justify. I have no answer to it. I am skeptical, again, of any effort to 
answer it through general, consistent, theoretical formulations. But 
time seems an important touchstone; if reconceived public structures 
fail - not initially but after experience under appropriate conditions 
- to elicit significant support, I would offer no further justifications to 
bolster them. Yet critics should note that, so too, if cost-benefit tech-
niques fail to find general acceptance, despite their advocacy and fre-
quent use, those techniques ought to be abandoned. Beyond that, I 
have no general, overarching, externally "objective," critical frame-
work that consistently rationalizes my proposals and critiques. But it 
might be worth reflecting whether such demands for consistency con-
tribute to creative rethinking of the regulatory state's pathologies. 81 
CONCLUSION 
This Symposium reflects skepticism about whether a New Public 
Law scholarship is emerging, what its philosophical, ideological, and 
policy commitments might be, and whether legal academics have the 
resources to generate distinctly legal perspectives on public policy. A 
common tenor in many of the articles is uncertainty about how these 
challenges should be resolved. In my view, it is still too early to seek 
the answers, for until we begin the hard work of examining concrete 
public programs and policymaking techniques, our ability to incorpo-
rate general, theoretical insights into a reconceived public policy will 
remain unknown. 
Others in this Symposium similarly urge a more specific, "policy-
based scholarship."82 But their aspirations seem to be for legal schol-
arship that competently replicates the familiar, instrumental, techno-
cratic thought of traditional policy science - albeit with a focus on 
problems peculiarly of interest to lawyers. Developing New Public 
Law scholarship in this direction, however, is unlikely to address dis-
affection with the modern regulatory state: as I have tried to argue, 
81. Cf. Leif, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nomina/ism, 60 VA. L. REv. 
451, 478 n.70 (1974) ("there is no meta-ethical rule that morality be logically elegant ... "). 
82. See Rubin, supra note 2, at 831. 
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exclusive focus on the instrumental consequences of policy is one of 
the pathologies of the current regulatory state. 
Taking cultural consequences seriously affords another possibility. 
Pursuing that possibility would not only draw on the distinct insights 
of modem legal thought, but might be a special obligation of legal 
academics. For, as this essay has suggested, past success at institution-
alizing traditional legal approaches and values is one of the principal 
sources of the disturbing, unintended cultural consequences of con-
temporary policy. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, contemporary legal 
scholarship, far more than economics or public policy thought, is 
aware of the plurality and conflict of values beneath public decisions 
and the constructive character of public law. Developing these central 
insights into specific critiques of actual public programs, policymaking 
techniques, and decisionmaking institutions will determine, I believe, 
whether we see the emergence of a genuinely New Public Law. 
